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CHAPTER l. INTRODUCTION 
Recent decreases in agricultural land prices and i ncreases in farm 
failures have raised questions conce rning the r e lationships be tween 
farmland prices, farm income, and survivability of farms ( Iowa Land Value 
Survey , Sco tt, 1983 ; Castle and Hoc h, 1982 ) . Since the mid - 1940s t he 
rate of fo r ced farm liquidations has inc r eased; fr om 1949 t o 1978 t he 
farm bankruptcy rat e inc r e ased nearly seven-fold. Altho ugh t he number o f 
forced liquidations has not increased as r apidly, due t o the lower total 
number of farmers. However, th ese figure s do not include voluntary 
liqu idations due t o financia l pressures . Also, r eal net inc ome per fa r m, 
while increasing some over the past 30 years, has shown an t nc rease tn 
annual variability (Blase and Hosemann, 1973). Farmers have also been 
inc reasing thei r l ever age, reducing s t ocks of h i ghl y liquid i nte r es t 
bearing financial assets ( Baker , 1984) , and have been ho lding higher 
inventorie s. During the time from th e Great Depr ession until t he late 
1970s, fa rml and prices increased regularly, even if there were fairly 
l arge variations in t he amount of the annual increases . During the 
1970s , land pr i ces cont inued t o inc r ease wh il e r eal fa r m tncome began to 
dec r e ase. The land prices dec r eases of the ear l y 1980s could be seen as 
a r ead justment to bring land prices back int o r e l ationship with real farm 
income and with r ea l int e r es t rates . 
The af fec t of ma c r oeconomic forces on the price of farmland and 
oth e r ar eas of agriculture has long been di scount ed unde r t he view t hat 
agricul t ure was immune f r om the boom or bust cyc lical patte r ns of the 
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rest of the economy. During the last 15 years, changes in the nonagri -
cultural sector of the economy have been atypical with respect to the 
previous 15 years in their magnitude and frequency, especially with 
regard to interest rat es and inflation. Macroeconomic conditions of the 
economy affect the availability of funds to farmers for borrowing, as 
evidenced by the rise in agricultural l oan interest rates in conjunction 
with the rise in nonagricultural loan rates. Macroeconomic conditions 
can also affect farmers' expectations about the futu re, which can 
influence farmers' decisionmaking processes. For example, a recession in 
the nonagricultural sector of the economy may cause fa rm e rs to have dif-
ferent expectations about future returns than if the nonagricultural 
sector was in a boom period given the same conditions in the agricultural 
sector. 
Variability of Returns 
Questions rarely examined are the effects of risk and uncertainty 
in the form of variability of both earnings from the use of land and of 
capital ga ins on land prices and the effectiveness of diffe r ent expansion 
and financial policies in dealing with these risks. Increases in the 
variability of returns, even though expected returns are unchanged, 
increase the riskiness of holding land and therefore, should have an 
effect on land prices. Changes in the expected variability of future 
land prices affect both expected capital gains and the ability of land to 
be used as security for debt financing. For example, if the collate r al 
value of land is based on the lowest expected future value of land at 
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some probability level over the life of the loan, then g iven the same 
trend in land prices, an increase in land price variability could lower 
the effective co llateral value of the land. This, in turn might affect 
the value of the land to the farmer. 
Along with the question of what a r e the effec ts of the se less than 
fully understood factors, arises the questions of how can farmers control 
the effects on their farms and what new management skills a farmer will 
need to possess in the future t o deal with changes in farm financing. 
If the variability in farm income obse rved in the last 15 years 
continues and economic conditions in both the U.S. and world remain 
volatile, then the late '80s and early '90s could become a period of 
variable land prices as well as variable farm income. The effect of land 
price variability on the survivability and potential for expansion of 
farms becomes of great interest to fa rmer s, farm lenders, and those 
involved in farming at all levels. 
Past examinations of land pricing have dealt primarily with the 
relationship of capital gains, current inc ome, and such variabl es as size 
of ope ration, size of equipmen t used, land productivity, financial t erm 
available to borrower, age of ope r ator, etc. to land prices (Doll et al. , 
1983). Many studies examin ed expansion of farm ope rations with the goal 
of maximizing eithe r a stream of profits or the net worth of th e farm 
over some planning horizon. Even though this has an implied relationship 
to the survivability of the operation, until r ecently survivabilit y of 
the farm has not been a ma i n focus and has rare ly been spec ifically 
included when examining land pricing and expansion. Some earlier studies 
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have looked at survivability but mainly with respect to the production or 
financial risk involved in various parts of the operation such as in 
using debt as compared to equity financing o r buying versus leasing 
asse t s. 
With little apparent risk of downward land price movement based on 
pas t land price trends, the only majo r fear of farm failure has been from 
over- extending into debt to the point wher e one o r two bad years in 
producing or marketing a c rop would cause insolvency. Downward land 
price movement adds a new dimension beyond production and marketing 
risks. That ri sk comes from the threat of lower land prices undercutting 
the value of the asset base on which present debt is secured or upon 
which future debt financing was planned. 
Farm Goals 
When examining farm expansion, the question of what is the appropri -
ate objective function arises. Previous studies have often either 
maximized the present value stream of future profits or the terminal net 
worth of the operation. Wise and Brannen ( 1983 ) and others have looked 
at the question of multiple objec tive functions and how they rank in 
order of importance to farmers . Nearly all studies have shown that the 
most important goal of farmers is to stay in business . Before the 
increased risk of farm failure observed in th e last few years, the ri sk 
of farm failure from over-ext ending the debt situation of a farm was 
small due to the general upward trend in land prices and the resulting 
capital gains . The use of profit or net worth maximizing objective 
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functions for decision making, in situations with an underlying assump-
tion of increasing land prices or a t least no possibilities of land price 
decrease, may have pr ovided realistic decision plans given the perceived 
lack of land price risk. However , recent c hanges in land prices and land 
pr ice variability may make the use of the objective of maximizing profits 
or net worth less than optimal in reflecting how farmers make decisions 
under uncertainty unless these changes are included in t he models . 
There are several ways to add the goal of staying in busines s into a 
decision making model by using farmer imposed debt financing restric-
tions. One restriction would be to limit debt financing by only using a 
portion of the assets as co llate ral. In other words, the farmer when 
calculating a self- imposed debt limit would subt ract the value of a base 
portion of the operation from the total value of the operation and 
calculat e the desi r ed maximum debt level from the remaining assets. A 
second type of restric tion wo uld be to use a desired maximum debt to 
asset ratio fo r the operation as a whole . 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to examine the recent phenomenon of 
decreases in the price of agricultural land, primarily focusing on I owa 
farmland, and to evalua t e the impact of this on farms . Four basi c 
questions will be examined 
l . What are the effec ts of land price va r iability on survivability 
and g rowth potential of fa rms? 
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2. What are the effects of different financ ial and expansion 
policies on survivability and growth of farms? 
3 . What is the effect of variability in land prices, income, 
gene r al price levels, and interest rates on the ability of farmers to 
finance expansion, in part by examining under normal and worse case sit -
uations what levels of debt a farm c an manage? 
4. What have been the recent changes 10 land price trends and vari -
ability? 
The issue of land pricing, both the theoretical and empirical 
aspects, is not the primary focus of this report. However, an attempt is 
made to identify factors which influence land prices that also affect 
other areas of interest to this report. For example, if interest rate 
variability affects both land prices and the availability of funds for 
investment by a farm firm, then examining the effect of a change tn 
interest rate variability on survivability and expansion without 
considering the effects on land prices can lead to incorrect 
conclusions. 
Concerning the farm model itself, the main emphasis is on the finan -
c ial part of the model, an area often overly simpl ified tn farm models. 
Here again, the problem of manageability comes int o play. The vast 
number and types of sources of c redit available t o farmers, the large 
diversity in the availability of c redit management policies for use by 
both lenders and farmers, the possibility of leasing or renting assets 
instead of purchasing them, and the effects of off-farm income on the 
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financ ial stability of the farm allows for almost an infinite number o f 
financial management options available to fa rmers. 
Farm Financing 
Of key impo rtance in this study, i s how a fa rm finance s new invest-
ments. There are two t ypes of funds availabl e fo r investment equity and 
debt. Equity financing is availabl e based on the past and present 
r e turns of the farm. Debt financ ing r elies upon e xpec ted future returns 
to asse ts. Debt financ ing creates a future obligation t o repa y the debt 
plus financing costs. Where the funds to meet these obligations are 
expected t o be gene rated is important to the financ ial structure of the 
farm. Also important to the financ ial structure of the farm are the 
assets that ar e used as sec urity o r co llat e ral fo r ~ loan. During the 
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1970s, many farmers were refinancing land t o take advantage of unrealized 
c apital gains to make downpayment s on new land purchases. Th is places 
both the old and the new land as security against the loan, yet if the 
financing costs befo r e the new debt a r e a t o r app r oaching the limit of 
what the o ld land could be expected to carry , then the entire f inanc ing 
cos ts of the new d eb t may be expected t o be met by r e turns f r om the new 
land. The problem arises when future r e turn s do not me e t expec tations . 
Then, profitabl e assets such as the o ld l and at its old financing costs , 
may have t o be liquidated t o meet debt obliga tion s on new nonprof itable 
land at i t s higher financ ing cos t. 
The re a r e two basic type s of r eturn s f r om holding and using farm 
asse t s . First a r e cap ital gains returns which occur from changes in the 
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value of the assets held over time . Second are ea r nings r e turns from the 
use of the assets in a productive process. 
For most assets other than land, and certainly current assets, the 
use of the assets decreases the value of the asset (de preciation), and 
except in times of high inflation for farm assets r e lative t o prices in 
general, capital gains are negligible. 
There are separate risks involved in borrowing against future 
capital gains and earnings returns due to the differences in certainty 
and variability of these returns . Therefore, a change in either the 
variability of, or the expected leve l of either type of return affects 
the risk of borrowing on those future returns. 
Expected capital gains and earnings returns for land have tradition-
ally both been positive (Melichar, 1979, pp. 1085, 1086). Capital gains 
returns to· land come from land price changes over time . Since the 
capital gains returns are not realized until the land is sold (Plaxico 
and Kletke, 1979, p. 327), usually at the end of the operation's life, 
these returns if they are to be utilized for investment, must be used for 
debt financing. Capital gains returns on land are different than other 
types of returns in that from the point of view of the operation capital 
gains are not realized until the land is sold, usually at the time the 
farm is sold. Earnings returns result from the productive activity for 
which the land is used. 
Of concern when using debt financing, since it t s based on expected 
future r eturns, is the variability of or lack of certainty in the l evel 
of the returns. If the actual r eturns realized are less than expec t ed 
9 
wh en the debt was incurred, the r eal ized r etur ns may not be enough to 
repay the d e bt incurred and the cos t of using debt. Several things 
affect t he degree of uncertainty of t he returns. One of these is time. 
The longer the time between when the debt is incurr ed and when the 
returns ar e r eal ized, the more uncertain the expec t ed returns become. 
This is o f specia l importance when using debt financed by expected 
capital ga ins returns on land. The accumula t ed capital gains from own1ng 
land at a point in time may be quite large, but the rea l ized gain if the 
l and is sold at some future time may be much smaller o r even negative if 
land prices decrease tn the future. Time also affects the uncerta inty of 
predic ted capita l ga1ns r eturns in that the future prediction made is 
l ess certain, or mo r e risky , the longer the time until those capi ta l 
gains are expected to be realized. 
The financial st ruct ure of the farm sector has changed dramatically 
over the last 20 years. The liquidity of farms has changed greatly as 
farme r s are holding a smal ler percent of their assets as financial as sets 
(Un ited States Department of Commerce, various yea r s) . Also, relative ly 
low r a tes of price increases f or farm products relative to increases in 
machine r y and land prices have decreased the percent of t otal assets that 
are current assets. This has c hanged t he balance sheet o f farmers 
(Boeh l je and Eidman, 1983) even though farm inventories have not changed 
as dramatic ally. 
Thi s problem is compounded by the fact that not only are l onge r t e rm 
assets l es s l iquid bu t these assets typic ally gene r ate lowe r cash flows 
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than curren t assets hav ing a large r po rtion of their returns Ln the fo rm 
o f capital gains returns. 
Farm debt has also changed dramatically in the last 20 years. The 
av e rage per farm debt in Iowa for farms with debt tripled from 1969 to 
1978 (United States Department of Agriculture , 58706 , 1984). While 
interest rates for farm loans increased 110% from 1965 to 1981 (United 
States Government Printing Office, 1983 ) . The effect of these changes on 
financing costs to farmers has been profound. 
The increase in debt cannot be solely accounted fo r because of 
inc reases in asset prices, and some increase in leverage has occurred. 
Thi s al so can be somewhat accounted for by the change in the balance 
s hee t o f farms since longer term assets have traditionally been leveraged 
more highly by farmers than current assets; so as _long term assets make 
up a larger portion of the value of t otal assets, the overall leverage of 
the farm will increase in the l ong term, given the traditional leverage 
percentages of assets. 
Increased financing costs have seve ral effects on farm income . 
There are two causes of increased financing costs, inc r eased amounts of 
debt and increased interest rat es. These have different effects on farm 
income. Increased debt can come from increasing the leverage o f the 
farm . This gives the farme r control of more assets with the same amount 
o f equity which increases g ros s returns to assets. Since interest costs 
increase with an increase in debt, the c hange in ra te of return to equity 
equity depends on the r e lative interest rat e and the rate of r eturn on 
assets. The rate of r eturn on equity can be expressed as 
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e = L(r-i) + r 
where 
e rate of r et urn on equity, 
L leverage = D/E, 
r rate of return on assets, 
i = interest rate, after tax, 
D debt, 
E = equity. 
As leverage increases the variability of the rate of return to equity 
increases but at a faster rate. The variance of the rate of return on 
assets remains constant. 
For an increase in interest rates, the rate of return on equity 
decreases while the variability of returns to assets remains unchanged. 
There are two ways the debt load of a farm can change. The first ts 
by the farmer increasing the leverage of the farm. Second is when the 
value of the assets held increases and the farmer maintains the 
leverage. 
If farmers increase their leverage in the face of increasing 
interest rates and increasing variability of rate of return on assets, 
there will be an unambiguous incr ease in the variability of the rate of 
return to equity a nd an ambiguous change in the rate of return to 
equit y. 
If there is an increase in asset values and the farmer maintains t he 
same leverage by increasing debt and if the rate of return on assets 
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remains the same, the rate of return on equity is the same although total 
net returns increase, with the increased r e turns comes an increase i n 
variablity of income, if the coefficient of variation i s unchanged for 
the rate of returns on assets. 
When examining the role of land in a farm, espec ially a g rain farm, 
the product ion asset qualities of land are obvious. But the r ole of land 
as a financial asset is often ove rlooked . Land purchases are a stor e of 
wealth just as are savings account s stock po r tfolios , or the proverbial 
mattress full of money. As the price of land changes , so does the 
farmer ' s wealth. The price of land is in part determined by how wel l it 
compares to other assets used to store wealth for example, its returns, 
risks, ease of acquisition or sale. Also, how the farmer incorporates 
land into his / her overal l financial scheme, affects how land pr i ce 
changes affect the farm's g r owth and expansion. A 10 pe r cent change in 
land prices has s i gnificantly different effects
0 
on a farmer who is highly 
leve raged than on one who has 100 percent equity. Also a farme r' s 
ability to borrow funds, one form of liquidity, are affected by land 
price changes differently depending on the proportion of total assets 
held by the farmer as land . 
With the focus of this thesis being the affects of land pr i ce 
changes and variability on farm survival, those fact o r s which cause or 
are related to land price changes are o f interest. The theo r etical basis 
for cap i tal asset pricing is the capitalized value of expected ret ur ns 
from holding that as set . The two primary returns to holding land are 
one, earning r e turns from the productive use of the land i n the farming 
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operation and two, t he capital gains returns from Land price changes 
while holding the Land. Other cos ts or returns that are Less obvious and 
ha rder to measure are such things as the added cos t of acquiring a given 
level of funds to maintain the operation of the farm after th e acquisi -
tion of a parce l of Land or the effect of hete r ogenity of Land on its 
value. 
The capitalization rate used depends upon several things . These 
include the relative returns available on competing assets, interest 
rates (real and nominal), and the amount of riskiness of the returns to 
holding Land . 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The numbe r of studies on land pricing is as numerous as a r e t he 
factors being e xamined. Eberle ( 1983 ) and Harris and Nehring ( 1976) 
examined the effects of loan t e rms and land con t racts on land prices . 
Productivit y of land was found to be the ma i n determinant in land price 
dif f e r e nces by Blase and Hosemann (1 973 ) and Hammill ( 1959) . Soil 
qualit y and commodity pr ices we r e found importan t in land pric ing by 
Chavus and Sh umway ( 1982) . These stud ies , as we ll as many othe r s , 
examined the dete r minant s of land pr1ce f or one parcel of l and at a g1ven 
time, fo r g ive n type buyers, in ce rtain locations, unde r given financial 
conditions. 
All o f the above are important in unde r standing wh y and how land 
pr1ces vary f r om farm t o farm. But of mor e int erest t o t his thesis a r e 
the fac t o r s that will affect the valuation of all fa rmland. I n other 
words , what are the basic properties that give land value? To find ou t, 
the purchase of land must vie wed at i t s most basic level , as an 
i nves tme nt . 
Harrington ( 1983) defines value as, 
the fair price an investo r wou ld be willing to pay fo r a fi rm, a 
por tion of a firm, o r any other asset. Value is dete r mined by a 
combination of three fa c tors 
1 . the s ize of t he antic ipated returns, 
2 . the d a t e that th ese r e turns will be r ece iv ed , 
3. the ri s k that the inves t o r takes to obtain the r etur ns . 
The fir s t t wo o f Harringt on' s factors are we ll-understood and well-
resea r ched, as evidenced by the shee r volume of production cost 
estimates , est imated production f unctions , and survey data ava i lable to 
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tell farmers what it will take to produce a given crop and the prices the 
farmer will pay for inputs and receive for outputs. However, the third 
factor, risk, especially with respect to financial risk, has only 
recently been given the attention deserved. Shalit and Schmitz (1982) 
found that savings and accumulated r eal estate debt were the main 
determinants of land prices. They showed that the amount of debt land 
can carry affects its price and that an easing of credit policies by 
lenders can cause higher land prices. The implications of this are 
serious if l enders do not r ealize the effects their policies can have on 
land prices. If steadily increasing land prices cause lenders to be less 
restrictive in their lending policies, t his can cause increases in land 
prices and a seemingly end l ess cycle could be started. Shalit and 
Schmitz's observations fit the scenario of the steadily increasing land 
prices and easy credi t t erms for buying land in the late 1960s and the 
early and mid-1970s. Shalit and Schmitz allude to the fact that this 
process could work just as effectively in the other direction in that 
decreases in the debt carrying capacity of land, for whatever reason, 
decrease the value of the land. Tweeten and Martin (1966 , p. 392) make 
more of a direct warning 
These results suggest no cause for alarm or panic among land buyers 
but do sound a note of caution f or buyers who could not weather at 
least the downward adjustment in land values impu t ed to t he specula-
tive element. 
It is the link between land prices and lenders' policies that is 
critical. If l ender s are unaware or ignore the effect their lending 
policies can have on land prices and base thei r lending policies on past 
land prices, then they are basing their policies on things that their own 
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policies are in part determining , and a change in po licy could have 
dramatic effects . 
White and Ziemer ( 1982) developed a land pricing mod e l that uses 
mean land r e turns, variance of land r e turns, and the covariance of land 
returns and other nonagr i cultural investment r eturns to determine land 
pric es . Thes e last three studies repr esent a change to viewing land 
prices in a mo r e macroeconomic view. 
Most of the r esearch on l and prtces has focused on the demand for 
fa rmland. The supply of fa rmland in the previously mentioned st udies has 
usually bee n assumed to be f ixed or at l e ast not price dependent . 
In st ud ies examining land prices in a mic r o conce pt, i. e., pr ices 
fo r a ce rtain parce l o f land in a given time and place , the number or 
rate of land transactions i s sometimes included as a pa r ameter in the 
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land prtcing model to es timat e the s upply of land. The question of 
whether the volume o f transactions t s a proxy for the supply of land as 
opposed to a measure of the quantity suppl i ed has no t r eally been 
examined. lf most land transactions take place f or nonpr ice r easons such 
as farmer r ~ tirement, the farmer moving, o r fa rm fai l ur e , the number of 
land t r ansactions would not be expected t o be positively co rrela t ed to 
land prices . Do ll et al . ( 1983) in their examination of variables used 
in expl aining fa rmland prices, found t hat tn only 14 of 26 model s that 
used a measure of the number of transact i ons as an exp l ana tory var iabl e 
was the coe fficient of the hypothes ized s i gn . Thi s would support the 
idea that farml and avai l ab ilit y is independent of land prices, or just 
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that the number of transactions is not a very good proxy for the supply 
of farmland. 
With approximately 3 percent of the total amount of farmland in the 
United States transferred each year (Doll et al., 1983), the amount of 
land that trades is not nea r the limit. Also, steadily increasing land 
prices may actually reduce land available for sale in that if expected 
capital gains from land increase, expected total returns to holding land 
increase and thereby increase the value of the land to the holde r . 
Two studies have examined land pricing with specific r eference to 
the issue of land supply. Herdt and Cochrane ( 1966 ) take an approach 
where land prices are determined in a market sett i ng with both supply and 
demand functions for land. They find that interest rates, the unemploy-
ment rate, and the number of farms are relatively important in determin-
ing the supply of land . However, they find that the cofficient for 
interest rates has the wrong sign, i.e., opposite of the hypothesized 
sign, and is significant. Tweeten and Martin ( 1966) use a 5- equation 
recursive model that does not determine land supply directly but that 
determines the rate of real estate transfers, farm numbers, and Land in 
farms. These are then used as indicators of quantity of land supplied in 
the determining of land price. Some of the variables Tweeten and Martin 
used to determine the indicators of land supply were total c r opland, the 
ra tio of farm to nonfarrn earnings, the unemployment rate, machin~ry 
stocks, and capital gains. 
Richardson e t al. (1983) , used a recursive model to study the 
effects of leasing and leverage on growth and survivab il ity o f beg inning 
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Texas High plains cotton farms. A primary conclusion was that maximizing 
leverage increased the risk of farm failure. They also found that 
leasing was more profitable than purchasing land or machinery. However, 
machinery and land prices were assumed to follow the general consumer 
price index. Given the more rapid rise in land and machinery prices than 
for the general price level during the late 1960s and 1970s, these 
results would tend to favor leasing more than if more realistic price 
changes had been used, since inc reases in land and machinery prices 
relat ive to prices in general would increase real c apital gains from 
owning assets. 
Antle (1983) describes the incorporation of risk into production 
analysis. Antle shows that dynamic production relationships are 
s ufficient to make risk important regardless of whether farmers are risk 
neutral, risk loving, or risk averse. Antle's effo rts a r e limited t o 
production risk but can be generalized fo r all types of risk including 
financial risk. 
Baum and Harrington ( 1983) and Hatch et al. (1982) examine the 
USDA ' s typical farm serLes Ln whi ch the USDA has developed 20 typical 
farms based on location and production characteristics. Farm character-
i stics were dete rmined by survey and from this the effects of different 
economic situations and political policies can be estimated for these 
average farms . The effec t s of diffe rent financing strategies wa s 
examined; however, the effects of land pr1ces and land price changes 
were not specifically examined. 
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Hinman and Hutton (1971) examined the effects of different equity 
positions of expansion and survivability of Pennsylvania dai ry farms . 
They used management efficiency t o indicate levels of expected returns to 
the operations. Although no specific changes in variance of r eturns were 
included i n the studies for diffe r ent levels of returns, h igh expected 
returns coupled with high equit y positions not only yielded higher net 
worths and income levels when compared to decreases in the equity or 
returns , but also resulted in sma ller coefficients of variation for both 
income and net worth . 
Patrick and Eisgruber (1968) examined the effects of interes t rates, 
l oan limit s , and managerial ability on the levels and variability on farm 
tncome. They found that more re st rictive loan limits delayed or 
forestalled farm failure of average and low level manage r s , i . e., middle 
and low levels of expected r eturns but reduced the net worths of high 
ability managers. 
Feldstein (1980) developed a theoretical model of land pr1ces that 
had land prices as part of a portfolio decision made by farmers. 
Feldstein used tax rates, the marginal physical pr0duct of land, price 
levels, inflation, the price of land, int e rest rates, land and capital 
holdings, risk aversion, varianc e of land returns, and the covariance of 
land returns and cap ital returns as determinants of land prices . 
Feldstein shows that not only after-tax yields are important in 
determining land prices but that asset yield uncertainty is also 
important in determining land prices. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL BASIS 
Land Values 
The value of land as a capital asset comes from capita l izing the 
futu re r eturns expected from holding the land. These returns take two 
f orms, earnings a nd capital gains. The values of t hese different types 
of r e turns t o t he farmer are different in that the uses the fa r mer may 
put the r etu r ns to are diffe r ent. Earnings returns are r eceived on a 
r egular basis and , once they are rece ived , the farmers can do with them 
as they see fit. Capital gains returns, on the othe r hand , occur on a 
r egul ar basis but are not real ized by the farme r until t he land is so l d. 
Unrealized c apital gains may be borrowed against and those funds put t o 
use t o r ece ive their own r e turns; however , s 1nce the .ca pital gains a r e 
unrealized, the amount o f the capital gain could change befor e it is 
r ealized and after it has bee n borrowed aga ins t. 
Ther efor e , under the Capi tal Asset Price Method the va lue o f Land 
l.S 
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where P is the present value of a n acre o f land, E. is the expected 
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earn1ngs r e turn tn t e t year, Cil i s the capita lization rate for 
ea r ni.ngs returns h . i th . . in t e i year , G. is the expec t ed capital gains 
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. . th 
return in t he t yea r , B. 1s the port ion of the capital gains that the 
l 
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farmer may borrow in t he ith year, and ci
2 
is t he c apitalization rate for 
capital gains in the ith yea r. T is the expected life of t he asset in 
years. This differs in a numb e r of ways from traditional formulas for 
land values in that both earnings a nd capital gains are c apitalized, no t 
just earnings as in the income valuation approach t o land pricing , that 
the different types of returns a r e capitalized at different r ates and 
that those rate s vary ove r time. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Theory states that the capitali zat i on rate 
of an a sse t should reflect both the ri skiness of the ret ur ns and the 
correlation o f the r e turn of that asset to t hose of the ma r ket in 
gene ral. So if e arn ings and cap ital gains are unco rrela t ed and /o r have 
different corr elations t o market r et urns in general , as suggested by 
empirical evidence (Montgome ry and Tarbet, 1968) , the diffe rent types of 
r e turns r ep r esent different risks to the farmer and should be capita l ized 
at different r ates. These c apitalizat ion rates should also change over 
time to r ef l ec t the level of uncertainty about expected future returns 
fa rther in the future. 
The exac t definition of expected earning r eturns is an issue of much 
debate . The E. 's in equation 3 .1 should be afte r- tax earnings and a r e 
1 
affected by the lever age of the farm in that debt financing of land 
entai ls fixed financ ing cost which affects earn i ngs. Most of the ear lier 
land pric ing models have factors which affect ind i v idual farmers expected 
ea rnings, E. , o r capitalization rat e fo r ear nings, C. 
i il 
These include 
such things as s ize o f o pera tion, manage rial effic i ency, level of 
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technology , level of risk aversion, interest rat es , or inflation. Some 
recent wo rk has examined the importance of capital gains to land pricing. 
Plaxico and Kletke compared different valuations of capital gains. They 
did not consider risk in specific but used "a discount rate as determined 
by the opportunity cost of capital or the required rate of r e turn'' 
(Plaxico and Kletke, 1979, p. 327), this doesn't fully incorporate the 
concep t o f risk into capital ization . 
Most of the land that is sold in I owa is put on the market by owners 
where potential buyers can formulate their present value of the land for 
sale and place bids for it. Land is put on the market by sellers if they 
feel that their present value of the land compares favorably to the going 
rate for farmland. This is a genera l concept of how the land market 
works . 
The s upply theory for farmland ts not as fully developed as the 
demand aspects of farmland. At the aggregate level, the supply of land 
available for sale at different prices is the main issue. However, many 
things cloud this simple question. One such thing is the heterogeneity 
of farmland. Not only does the quality of land vary from acre t o acre, 
but the quality of a given acre of land varies from farmer t o farmer in 
that if inputs a r e considered homogeneous, if they can be substituted for 
one another without a change in the productivity of the operation, then 
the land is heterogeneous between producers because of the immobility of 
land. 
Another i ssue is so cal led nonpr1ce entry of farmland into the 
market. This is becoming more of an issue as the failure rate of farms 
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increases . There are several apparent reasons other than the price of 
land that may cause farmland to be placed on the market. Herdt and 
Cochran (1966) list four main categories of nonprice r easons, (1) death, 
(2) financial, (3) occupational mobility, and (4) location mobility. 
The reason these nonprice factors bring farmland into the market is 
that they lower the value of the farmland to the owners to a point below 
the going farmland prices. The different types of land owners, owner-
operators, and landlords are affected by these factors. For example, 
landlords may be more likely to sell land and switch to nonland asset 
than owne r-operators if there is a shift in the relative returns of 
holding land versus nonland assets because owner - operators costs to 
liquidate may be greater due to the r educed returns on other assets such 
as machinery, buildings , o r even managerial skil ls if land is sold. 
Someone thinking about acquiring or se lling land t o farm should use a 
broad scope wh en examining the value of the land to them. Fo r a specula-
tive land holder, earnings may be limited t o the rent available fr om 
renting the land out. For an owner-operator or potential owner - ope rato r, 
the change in t otal returns f or the individual must be taken into account 
when land transactions are considered. This would include changes in 
productivity of other assets such as machinery and available labor due to 
the acquis ition of the land. This means that the value of land to a 
farmer may change as the size o f the operation changes . Harris and 
Nehring show that th e maximum bid price for land increases then decreases 
as farm size inc reases . Theo r etical ly, this implies an optimal fa r m size 
and, given the relatively fixed supp ly of l and, also implies an optimal 
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number of farms. Each farme r will have a set of maximum bid prices or 
ma r ginal land values for all parcels of land; also the maximum bid prices 
will change as the size of the farm varies. The optimal size would vary 
for each farm due to unique production functions for each farmer. This, 
in turn, implies that each farmer has a unique maximium bid price. The 
optimal sized farms and those expanding to optimal size would tend to 
keep land prices at or near the highest maximum bid level . Land would 
tend to accumulate in optimal sized farms. 
Another issue that must be considered when looking at r easons f o r 
the entry of land into th e market is that capital gains taxes are only 
due when those gains are rea lized not when they are incurred , and 
therefore the after- tax price rece ived for land is effected by the length 
of ownersh ip. Capital gains taxes make the after- tax price r eceived by 
land selle r s , who have large unrealized capital gains in their land, less 
than that f o r those land owners who have smaller unrealized capital gains 
f or a given sales price. Given the steady increaes in land prices during 
the 1960s and 1970s this would imply that newer fa r mers would have a 
higher after-tax price received on the sale o f land than older farmers 
and would therefore, be more likely to sell land if the present value o f 
all land dec reased, cetibus peribus. This is important when the increase 
in the average age of farmers ove r the last two decades is consider~d. 
An individual will, in theo r y , buy land wh en the present value of 
land is greater than the gotng land price , and a land owner will sell 
land when the present value of that land is less than what he/ she could 
receive by selling the land . These two condit ions theoretically 
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determine the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded of land. The 
factors that change the present value of land determine the supply and 
demand of land. What complicates this is that each land parcel has a 
different present value to each potential land owner and that conditions 
that change the presen t value of a parcel of land to one person may or 
may not c hange the present value of that or any other pa r cel of land f or 
another person. 
The Farm Model 
Empirical models and tests performed 
The farm model used was developed from the Iowa State University 
Business and Financing Planning Model. The major revisions are to allow 
fo r a more accurate and realistic handling of finances, especial l y debt, 
to allow f o r manipulation of certain variables; primarily land prices, 
interest rates , c redit limits, assets ratios , a~d debt t o asset r atios, 
to facilitate th e evaluation of different policies r egarding debt, and 
expansion under different scenarios of income and prices. 
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CRS CRLT ( -TOTDT + PRCP ) - TOTOT 
t t t t 
M t 
TOTDTt = E E DEBTTYt 
T=l Y=l 
TA = CA + IP + LP • LA + LHF 
t t t t t t 
DTA TOTDT -PRCP / TA 
t t t t 
NO It net operating inc ome in time t' 
TRt = total r evenue in time period t ' 
t+l 
vet = t o tal variable costs in time period t' 
-
NO It = estimated ne t o perating income in time 
CAt current assets ln time t' 
IAt intermediate assets ln time t' 
LA = t acres of land he l d in ti.me t' 
YR the time period. 
t' 
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b., d. = estimated coefficients, 
l l 
et, 0 ~ I = the random error term t' ,:I' t t 
X = a random variable representing the varLance in net 
operating income, 
-CFOt =estimated cash fixed expenses in time t, 
CFOt cash fixed expenses in time t, 
-NCFt = estimated noncash fixed expenses in time t, 
NCF noncash fixed expenses in time t, 
t 
NBTEt net before tax earnings in time t, 
INTP = total interest payments in time t, 
t 
CAPGt capital gains (losses) from the sale of land in time t, 
INTLHF interest rec e ived on financial assets in time t. 
t 
















= the interest rate in ti.me t on a loan o f type T issued 
Y, 
net tncome in time t, 
income tax in ti.me t, 
total sources of funds in t ime t' 
= total uses of funds tn time t' 
total principal payments in time t, 
= family consumption in ti.me t, 
principal payment in time ton DEBTTYt' 
tn 
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FATit funds available to invest in time t' 
NCHFt negative cash flow in time t' 
LP 
t 
land price in time t' 
CRLT = total credit limit 
t 
for the farm in time t' 
m. collateral value in percent 
i 
of assets i n type i' 
CS Rt c redit r eserve in time t' 
TOTDTt total outstanding of the farm ln time t' 
PRCPt = principal payments on debt in time t' 
credit r eserve available for investing in assets in time 
t' 
r eduction in debt to meet c r edit limit in time t , 
total assets ln time t, 
LHFt = financial assets, specif i cally the land holding fund , in 
time t, 
DTA debt to asset ratio of the farm 1n time t , 
t 
DTAM debt to asset ratio maximum, 
COEt =estimated cash o perating expenses in time t, 
COE cash ope r ating expenses in time t, 
t 
TCE total cash expenses in time t, 
t 
GNPDt index of al l pr1ce l evels in time t, 
AVNOit moving average of per farm net operating lncome in time 
t' 
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VARNOI =variance of NOI during a y year time period ln time t, 
t 
CVLPt covariance of land prices during last y years at time t, 
RLINTt r eal interest rate ln time t, 
LOANRTt = index of loan interest rates paid by farmers ln time t, 
ACRSLDt = acres of land sold ln time t. 
Net operating inc ome is the difference between t o tal revenue and 
variab l e operating costs (1) . Net operating tnc ome is estimated from the 
value of the int e rmediat e assets and the size o f the operation in acres 
(3) . Cash operating e xpens es are estimated fr om intermediate assets and 
size of the operation (2) . Actual cash operating expenses are assumed to 
equal estimated expenses ( l 0) . Acres of land held is used fo r estimating 
NO! instead of total land value bec ause acres more ac curat ely indicates 
the s tze o f the farm than total land value. Land prices will be 
exogenously changed in the study and these changes should not affect NOI 
as defined in the mod e l. NO! in time t is the estimated NOI multiplied 
by a random variable, X, to s i mula te the random variance in NOI from yea r 
to year ( 4) . 
Cash fixed expens es, CFO, are estimated f r om intermediate assets and 
land prices (5) . Actual CFO equal s estimated CFO (8). Total cash 
e xpens e are equal to the sum of cash operating expenses and cash fixed 
expenses ( 7). 
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Noncash expenses and depreciation are estimated from intermediate 
assets and a price l evel index (6). The only assets which in the model 
are depreciated are intermediate assets . Actual NCF equal s estimated NCF 
(9). 
Land prices are estimated from a moving average of per farm net 
operating income, variance in NOI, the past level of land price changes, 
variability of land prices, a price level index, an index o f r eturns on 
nonfarm assets, and an index o f interest rates paid by farmers on 
agricultural loans ( 11 ) . 
Net before tax earnings are equal t o net ope rating income minus 
fixed costs minus interest payments plus capital gains from the sale of 
land ( 15) plus interest r ece ived on financial assets ( 13) . 
The total interest payment on debt is equal to the sum o f interest 
payments on all outstanding debt s (14) . 
Net income is equal to net before tax income minus the income t ax on 
the income of the farm (16) . Total required uses of funds o f the farm 
over ope rating expenses consist of debt retireme nt payments and family 
consump tion (18). Total sources of funds for the farm consist o f net 
income plus the total revenue from the sale of any land minus the capital 
gains from the sa le of land plus the amount o f noncash fixed expenses 
plus the amount of funds used to finance cash expenses at the sta rt of 
the production period (17). Capital gains and noncash expens es are in 
the above equation since they are noncash items but were included in the 
calculation of net income; the funds used to finance cash expenses are 
added back since they subtracted from the stock of funds at the beg inning 
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of the production period and are not included in the estimate of net 
operating income. 
The funds used to finance cash expenses, YTCE , are subtracted from 
t 
the stock of funds at the beginning of the production period t o insure 
that the operation has on hand enough cash reserves or c redi t reserve to 
meet necess ary cash expense during the year . 
Lending institutions are assumed to place a cred it limit on the farm 
based on the collateral value of the assets held by the farm ( 20). Each 
type of asset has a different level of collateral value based upon the 
liquidity of that type of asset and the risk of price changes. The 
co llateral levels that lenders use for determining the credit Limit are 
affected by interest rates, lenders ' perceptions of future changes in 
price levels, and future farm income (21). The c redi t reserve for a farm 
is equal to the c redit limit for the farm at the beginning of the period 
minus the outstanding deb t of the farm, plus any debt r epayments in that 
period (22). 
Total assets at the beginning of a time period are the sum of the 
current assets, the intermediate assets, the land value, and the 
financial assets (24) . 
Farmers are assumed to have a self-imposed maximum debt to asset 
ratio as a form of financial management policy variable (25 and 26) . 
This ratio can be affected by price changes and changes in expected 
future income . 
Since the purchase or sale of land is usual l y made in 40 ac re incre-
ments, funds for the purchase o f land must be accumulated until a down-
payment can be made that is sufficient for the rest of the purchase price 
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to be debt financed if debt financing is to be used . Alternatively, the 
entire value of the purchase must be accumulated if only equity financing 
is to be used. Also, potential borrowings may be accumulated by not 
using the full extent of the c redit limit. When the sum of these sources 
is equal to the necessary funds needed, land can be purchased. Funds for 
the purc hase of land can be held one of two ways: first, as financial 
assets and second, by r educ ing the outstanding debt on the farm. 
How the farmer holds the funds for purchasing land depends upon 
the returns that can be earned from the funds. If the farmer can earn a 
highe r rate of return as financial assets than as equity in farm assets, 
then the farmer would prefer to hold them as financial assets and vice 
versa. If the after-tax returns on holding the funds as financial assets 
equal the after-tax cost of borrowing funds, there i~ no difference 
between holding the funds as financial assets or as equity in the fa r m 
when comparing the effect on the financial position of the farm. The 
r educt ions in debt from holding the f und s as farm equ i ty would add t o the 
c r edit reserve of the fa rm by the same amount of the r eduction in debt, 
so when land is purchased, the equity built up in the farm assets can be 
t ransfe rred from the existing assets to the newly purc hased land by using 
the ex isting assets as collateral to finance the diffe rence between the 
purchase price of the land and the co llateral value of the new land . The 
farm model i s explained in further detai l in the Appendix. 
Farm financing 
The process by whi ch the farmer r egulates and adjusts the debt 
str uct ure of the farm is complex given the variety o f sources of debt and 
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debt terms available to farmers. For s implification, it is assumed that 
there are only t hree t ypes o f deb t available to the farme r : c urrent, 
inte rmediate, and long t erm . The terms o f the debt are ass umed to be the 
s ame within each t ype of debt, c urrent, intermediate, and l ong term, 
regardless of the type of lender. Also, the maximum amount of debt 
extended to a farmer is the s ame for all l enders, i. e., all lend ers use 
the same criteria for c alculating lend ing limits. 
There are two primary credi t policy variables used in this a nalys is . 
First, is the debt-to-asset ratio of the farm whic h is an internal policy 
variable specific t o an individual fa rm. A fa rmer sets a maximum debt-
to-asset ratio that he/she wishes t o s t ay under. Expectations about 
future returns ( both mean and variance) , the farmer's l evel of risk 
aversion, the farmer's age and f amil y size, the l evel of off-farm i ncome , 
and o t her factors cou ld all influence an individual fa rm e r' s choice o f a 
maximum debt-to-asset r ati~. The second policy variable is t he c redit 
limit available to the farmer . This is determined by the l ending insti-
tution based upon the collate r al value o f t he assets held by the farmer. 
These co llat e ral values are affected by many things such as , the l ending 
institution's e xpectations about the farm economy , future changes in 
price levels, the availability o f loan funds to the lend er, and t he 
expected future demand fo r loan funds. There could also be facto r s that 
affect an individual f armer' s c r ed it l im it suc h as e xpe rience in farming, 
past produc tion, management, and marke ting records. 
The t wo bas i c sour ces o f f und s available fo r investmen t and to mee t 
unanticipated needs fo r fu nds from unusally low ear nings or changes in 
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technology are net funds generated from the operation of the farm and t he 
c redit reserve of the farm. The c redit reserve of the farm is the credit 
limit minus the amount of the outstanding debt of the farm at a point in 
time. 
These funds are used for five purposes: the meeting of debt repay-
ment obligations, family consumption by the farmer and family, replace-
ment of depreciation on interm~diate assets, investment in production 
expenses for the next production period, and investment in assets for t he 
e xpansion of the operation. Debt repayment and consumption expenses are 
met by the farmer even if this means a negative net flow of funds in the 
operation. 
The funds generated from the operation may not meet the need for 
funds to run the operation in a given year in which case the net funds 
from the operation for that year are negative. This i s not an uncommon 
occurrence given the production and price uncertainty found in farming. 
There are only two ways for the credit limit of a farm to dec rease . 
One is by a decrease in the value of the assets of the farm and th e reby ~ 
decrease in the collateral value of the farms assets; the second is by a 
change in the lending institution's l ending policies t o a tighter c redit 
policy. During the 30 years before the recent decreases in land price, 
the only ways that asset value of the farm decreased given the steady 
increases in l and prices were from eithe r liquidation of assets or 
depreciation o f intermediate assets. Until recent l y, the high rate of 
land price increase all but insured an annual increase in the credit 
limit of a farm. 
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The amount of funds at the start of production in the next year, 
t+l, after required debt repayment and consumption expenditures, is the 
s um of the c r edit reserve at the end of year t, CRS , plus the net flow 
t 
of funds from operations in year t, TSt-TUt' minus the funds necessary to 
start production year t+l, YTCE 
1
, minus any required investment in 
t+ 
intermediate assets to maintain asset ratios . If t h is amount is greater 
than zero, funds ace available for expansion investment. If the funds 
are less than zero, additional funds must be acquired from the liquida-
tion of assets to cove r the deficit. 
Financial tests 
Since time is divided into discrete segments, production periods or 
years in this study, it is assumed that the farm must meet certain tests 
before production can continue in the next period. 
The flrst of these financial tests for the farm is that the sum of 
the credit reserve and the net funds from operation at the end of the 
year must be greater than. o r equal to zero. The net funds fr om operation 
in a year could be negative as explained above, and the c r ed it reserve 
could become less than zero in a yea r if the credit limit decreases to 
where it i s less than the amount of oustanding debt. Positive net 
operating funds can be used t o repay debt if the c r edit reserve is 
negative. Also, a positive credit res e rve can be borrowed aga inst to 
replace negative net operating funds. However, if the sum of the c redit 
reserve and the net operating funds is less than zero t hen other funds 
will be needed usually from the liquidation of assets such as the land 
holding fund. 
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The second test is the securing of funds to begin the next produc-
t ion period. A certain l evel of funds, based upon the expected cash 
expenses for the next period, must be available to purchase production 
inputs and pay fixed cash costs that will be incurred before any r evenue 
from the operation in the next year is r eceived. 
The third financial test deals with asset ratios of the farm to 
determine if investment must occur to maintain necessary assets ra t i os . 
Asset ratios and their maintenance are discussed in the next section. 
If the farm has positive net funds available after meeting r eserves 
for future cash expense needs and making required asset investment, the 
farme r can invest in expansion of the farm ope ration. If the required 
need s are not met, liquidation of assets must occur. 
When assets must be liquidated, the farmer must determine what 
assets to sell off. The first and most obvious asset is the land holding 
fund, LHF. Since it is a financial asset it can be liquidated without 
affecting the production capabilities of the farm . Once the LHF has been 
fully liquidated, farm assets must be sold off . The most logical assets 
to sell off are intermediate assets above the opt imal level. The other 
alternative is the sale of l and and a corresponding reduction in current 
assets . 
In either case , wh en fa r m assets are liquidat ed, the amount of funds 
needed to be raised changes . There are three main reasons for this . 
The first reason is due to the r eduction of the credit limit of the farm 
when farm assets are sold off . Since the credit limit is based on the 
assets held by the farmer, the decrease in the cr~dit limit and resulting 
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resulting lowering of the credit res e rve may necessitat e the repayment of 
debt if the CRS becomes negative thus lowering the available funds from 
the sale of farm assets to meet o t he r needs. The second reason is a 
decrease in the amount of funds needed to meet expected futu r e cash 
expenses since those expenses are based in part on the amount o f farm 
assets held. The third reason is if land is sold the optimal level of IA 
is l owered, and required purchases of IA t o maintain optimal asset ratios 
may be lowered or elimina t ed; IA in excess of the optimal level may be 
available fo r sale. 
Since land is sold in disc rete size units, it is not Likely that the 
exact amount of assets can be sold to raise the exact amount of needed 
funds. So if land is sold and enough funds are raised, excess IA will 
not have to sold. This means that afte r the LHF is used up, the order of , 
sa l e of funds is l ) excess IA; 2) 80 acres of CA and no IA; 3) 80 acres, 
CA and excess IA; 4) 160 a c res, CA, and no IA; 5) 160 acres, CA and 
excess IA. If this l ast amount of sales does not raise the needed funds, 
the fa rm is considered bankrupt and the model run is t erminated. 
When land is sold, capital gains are incurred if land pr ices have 
risen. To minimize the tax burden from the capital gains it is assumed 
that the farmer will sell off the land that 1ncurrs the Least possible 
c apital gains . 
Also, if excess funds are raised f r om the liquidation of assets due 
t o the lumpiness of land sales, excess funds will be used t o repay debt. 
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Asset r atios and va lues 
The land held and the amounts of intermediate and current assets 
held by a farm are highly correlated due to the production relationships 
of these assets . The ratios of the values of the different types of 
assets are no t only affected by the correlation of the phys i cal assets 
but also by their r elative prices . Since land prices are o f major 
interest to this study, a model of the ratios o f the physical amounts of 
assets is necessary to insure that relative price changes are no t all owed 
to affect the pr oductivity o f assets . 
If there is assumed t o be no change in technology that affects the 
relative usage of the different types of asse ts when looking at r elative 
quantities of assets such as tons of fertilizer, t r actor s of a given 
ho r se power, or acres of land, and if there i s no outside investment in 
the farm other than asse t repl acement, the f oll owing rat es of change in 
asset value result. 
Current assets are r eplaced through the operation of the farm and 
therefore, their value changes by the rat e at which the price of those 





the value o f a current asset in time period t, 
index of cu rrent asset pric es tn time t. 
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For intermediat e assets, deprec iation is involved. The change in value 
o f intermediate assets de pends upon both the rate of c hange in inte rmed i-
ate asset prices and the amount o f depreciation that occur s , so that 
wh e r e 
( IA - NCF )( IADF ) 
t t t 
IAt = the val ue of an intermediate asset i n time pe riod t, 
NCFt t he amoun t of depreciation on intermed iat e assets, 
lADFt ind ex of intermediate asset prices. 
The value of land changes with the change in the prtce o f land, since 
the r e i s no depr eciat i on fo r land, so that, 
whe re 
( LA ( LP +OLP ) ) 
t t t 
DLPt the change in land price in yea r t, 
LVt = total land value i n yea r t, 
LAt = ac res of land held by the farm in year t. 
If the orig inal physical combination of assets ts assumed to be 
optimal from a pr od uction eff iciency standpoint , to maintain t hat opt i mal 
mix of assets t he rat ios of the deflated values of the assets must be 
maintained fo r eff i cien t produc tion. 
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Additional investment takes places in the farm over time, t o both 
maintain required asset ratios and for expansion purposes. When invest -
ment LS made t o maintain asset ratios, there is no question of how it 
will be divided between the different asset types. For expansion, th e 
investment 1s divided between the asset types in accordance with the 
ratios of assets based upon the r elat ive values of the different types of 
assets in order to maintain the init ial ratios of physical assets of the 
farm. 
Since the farmer is assumed to acquire the necessary level of 
current assets through the operation of the farm, only when new land LS 





ts maintained at all times. 
Intermediate assets wear out with use (dep r eciate), Land is assumed 
to have an infinite life span, and current assets are assumed to be 
r eplaced through the ope rat ion of the farm. Because of t hese facts, 
intermediate assets must be replaced in order to maintain a mix of the 
different types of assets that wil l maintain the ope rat ion at its 
original level. 
wh e re 
CAD 
t 
= a 1 + a 2 LAt 
CADt 1s current assets 1n constant dolla r s in year t, 





i s a constant val ue, 
a
2 
is a coeff i cien t of marginal cu rrent asset fo r a change in 
ac res. 
The optimal amount of intermediate assets is 
where 
IADt is intermediate assets in year t ln constant dollars, 
bl ts a cons tant , 
b
2 
i s a coefficient of marginal inte rmediate assets for a change 
in ac r es. 
To maintain this optimal level of intermediate assets, the deflated value 
of intermediate assets in any yea r t, IA /IAD F , divided by the land held 
t t 
in year t, LA , must equal the origina l level. There ts some level of 
t 
intermediate assets pe r ac r e that the farmer would o r could not l et 
intermediate assets fall be l ow and s till expec t to continue to pr oduce 
efficiently . This level c an be represented as B where 0 .SB .S 1 . 
The r efore, before production can begin in the next year, t+l, 
intermediate assets per acre must be greater than this mi nimum level . 
Anoth e r complication wi th asse t ratios is that land is bought in 80 
acre increments. It is unrealistic for the farmer to wait until land is 
purchased to star t increasing intermediate assets. Since the land 
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holding fu nd 1s used to store fund s until land can be purchased, a 
simila r fund cou ld be used to hold funds to 1nc r ease i nt ermediat e assets 
wh en land is bought. Howev e r, inte rmediate assets c an be purc hased 1n 
any amount, and obse r vab l e behavior o f farmers wou l d indicate that 
farme r s will acquire inte rmed iate assets above the optimal l eve l in 
an ticipation o f fu ture land acquis itions. There f or e , a fa rmer might 
divide ex pansion investment bet ween intermediate assets and the land 
holding fund so as t o keep the level of intermediate assets optimal, not 
wi th th e actual level o f land held, but wi th the poten tia l land the 
fa rme r could hold in year t , LA + ( LHF /LP ) . 
t t t 
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CHAPTER 4. DATA 
The income, expense, and asset information about Iowa farms was 
taken from the Iowa State University (various years ) annua l summaries. 
The data were from observations on Iowa farms pooled by farm size, in 
acres, from the years 1964 through 1981. The data used were limited t o 
farms classified as grain farms . The number of observations per year 
ranged from between 125 to 400 with approximately two-thirds of the 
observations coming from the two largest classes of farms. The Iowa Farm 
Business Survey is not a random sample of farms in I owa. It is a survey 
done among members of the Iowa farm business associa tion . The members of 
the association are probably, on the average, better managers, and in 
better financial positions, than Iowa farmers in general. The effect of • 
this on the re sults of the study are uncertain but probably raise the 
level of income for a given size operation . For the period 1978 t o 1983, 
the average net farm income per acre for farms in the I owa Farm Business 
Survey was approximately three times as large as for the entire state. 
But it must be remembered that the state data are for all farms and 
includes pasture land. 
Short term and Long term inte r est rates r ef lect those charged by 
Production Credit Associations and Fede ral Land Banks. Th e general price 
level indicator used is the Gr oss National Product deflator as repor t ed 
in the 1983 Economic Report to the President. 
Land prices were taken from the Iowa Land Value Survey and are based 
on surveys of licensed r eal estate brokers in Iowa. The survey 
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represent s a consistent source of land price information for the years 
1950 t hr ough 1984. 
Av e rage net farm income per acre fo r the e nti re stat e was collected 
from the USDA se ries , Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector, and is 
based on t o ta l net farm income per farm after inventory ad j ustment and 
inc ludes government pa yments. 
United St ates Department of Comme r ce data were used to dete r mine 
r e lative amounts and types of debt on ave r age fa r ms . Data in the Census 
of Agriculture divide f arms by states and farm t ype and by fa r m wi th debt 
and all fa rms. Info rmat ion on deb t divides debt i nto two categories, 
real es ta te and nonreal esta t e debt. Assets were listed by type. To 
de t e rmine t he portions of real estate deb t for land and buildings, the 
real estate debt was divided by the same proportions as the value of the 
land and buildings . Since farm type data are available onl y on the 
national l evel and state data a r e for all type s of fa rms to estimate co r n 
farms i n Iowa, the diffe r ences between all I owa farms and all U.S. fa r ms 
were ass umed to be the same as between I owa g rain farms and U.S. graln 
farms. Fo r example, the total debt to t otal physical farm asset r atio of 
all I owa farms is 12. 8 pe r cent larger than fo r all U.S. farms, .291 as 
compared to .258. It is, th e r efo r e, assumed that the TD/TA ratio of Iowa 
gra in fa r ms is 12.8 percent large r than for U.S. g r ain fa r ms. This gives 
Iowa grain farms a n estimated TD/TA ratio of . 308 as compared to . 273 for 
U. S . graln fa rms and .291 for a ll I owa farms . These figures are used for 
developing beg inning average fa rms to use in the model . The data in USDA 
SB706 provide info rmation for t r ends in r elative amounts of real es tate 
and nonrea l estate debt. 
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
Mod e l Specifications 
Income and expenses 
The r esults of the es timations of the income and expense equations 
fo r the farm model are presented in Table L. All coefficients are sig-
nificant at the 5 perc ent l eve l excep t for the intercept term and the 
land price coeff i cien ts in the equation fo r cash fixed ope rating 
expenses, CFO . 
2 
The R s a r e very high f r om a low of .85 to a high of 
. 99. 
The r e i s a high degree of multicollinearity among most of the 
independent variab les, (see corr elation coeff i c i ents in Table 2). The 
severity o f this probl em is reduced by limiting the number of independent 
variables in each equation and by th e assumption that farms ar e going to 
maintain asset ratios similar to those observed in the Iowa Farm Business 
Survey to main tain optimal efficiency of production . 
Asset ratios 
Levels of intermediate and curren t assets in constant dolla r s were 
estimated using ac r es of land, a t i me trend, and a dummy va riable for 
yea r s after 1973. Fo r intermediat e as sets, neither the effects of the 
time trend nor the dummy var iable were found to be signific ant. However, 
using only ac res of l and, the model est ima t ed ve ry well, (see Tab l e 3) 
. 2 
wLt h an R of . 94. For cu rrent assets , the time t r end was not found to 
be sign if icant if used with t he dummy variabl e, so, therefo r e only t he 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Correlation coeff i cients and probability not correlated i n 
parentheses 
IAN LAN CAN GNPD LP LV 
IAN 1.000 . 925 71 . 24477 .22465 . 24636 0.02975 
(.0000) (.0001) ( .0208) ( . 0451) (.0276) (.7820) 
LAN 1 .000 .49696 . 38107 . 38699 .30162 
(.0000) (. 0001) ( . 0005) (.0004) (.0041) 
CAN 1.0000 . 63414 . 61132 .94823 
( . 000) ( . 0001) (. 0001) ( .000 1) 
GNPD 1.0000 .98061 . 60612 
(.0000) ( . 0001) ( . 0001) 
LP 1 . 0000 .58701 
( .0000) ( . 0001) 
LV 1.0000 
( . 0000) 
Table 3. Constant dollar current (CAD) and intermediate (IAD) assets . 




variable Intercept LA Variable 
CAO 2390.41 57.5869 4374.475 
(0.29) (14 . 29)* (2.28)** 
IAD 2491.575 25.9850 
(5 . 88)* (32.09)* 
*Significant at the l percent level . 
**Significant at the 5 percent l evel . 
variables------------
R2 F-ratio 
. 7680 105. 92 
.9406 1029.8 
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To c heck the hypothesis regarding the lack of time trends in the 
asset ratios, the values of intermediate assets and curr ent assets per 
acre were calculated from the Iowa Farm Business Survey data and deflated 
by relevant price indexes. For intermediate assets, the following 
results were obtained 
IALA 152.24141 - 0.689274YEAR 
( . 0001) ( .0941 ) df = 82 
which show that for the period 1964 through 1981 in 1977 dollars, 
def lated intermediate assets per acre did not change significantly. Even 
though the coefficient for the year was significant a t the 90 percent 
confidence level, the equation only explained 3.4 percent of the total 
variation (i.e ., R2=0.0338) which would indicate that a time trend 
explains very little of the variation in intermediate ·assets per acre of 
2 
farms in variations in IALA; the R was only 0 . 25. 
Cur rent assets per acre were also tested t o see if a time trend 
exists . The r esulting equation was 
CALA 66.556102 + l.3 78911YR 
( .0006 ) 
Even though the coefficient was again significant, operation of th e 
overall model was ve r y poor with and R2 of only 0.1342. 
Land prices 
In developing the land price models, an effort was made not to use 
unobservable parameters, because economic theo ry would suggest that 
so 
fa rmers and others would ba se bids on land upon their knowledge , not upon 
unobservabl e facto r s. 
One of the key relationships in the mode l i s the effect of expec ted 
returns to owning l and, based on past performance, on the value of land. 
Ex pected returns to owning land include both capital gains and earnings 
r etur ns. Pre-tax capital gains a r e measured by the past change in land 
price. Earnings returns are measured by net farm income per acre. 
Wh en examining capital gains, two different sets of para~eters were 
examined. The first set i s a three- year moving average of past changes 
in land prices. The second set consist s of two parameters, the first i s 
the change in land price during the previous year, and the second the net 
ch ange in land price for the two years preceding the last year. The 
second set was found to give better result s than the first; thi s could 
indicate both expected future capital gains from recent changes in land 
prices and a wealth effect from past capital gains . 
When searching for a proxy of farm inc ome, the availabi lit y of data 
limits the choices available. The ideal parameter would be based on 
returns to land for gr ain farming. Two data sets were available . The 
first is total net farm income for the state of Iowa divided by acres of 
farm land in the state . The second is from the Iowa Farm Business 
Association Survey (IFBS). As with changes tn land prices two forms of 
the parameters were used . The first is the level of net farm income per 
acre , and second is the change in net farm income from year to yea r . 
The state data provided a better fit than the IFBS data. This may 
be due to the effect of other farm income on farmers' ability or desire 
to buy farmland since the IFBS data reflect income for only g rain farms . 
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Also examined wh en es timating land prices of land price change we r e 
the effects o f the r eal interes t ra t e, changes in l oan inte r est r ates, 
and moving ind exes o f the variability in both land prices and net farm 
income . 
Tabl e 4 shows the r esulting es timates fo r the land models. In the 
model for c hanges in land prices, the intercep t is 16.817 which means 
that if there had been no changes in land prices o r net farm income ove r 
the last three years, no change in interest rate f r om the pr evious year, 
and a zero r ea l interest rat e , land prices would have increas ed 16.8 
percent in a year. However, this is no t a stab le point since th e 
increase in land price would affect next year ' s land pr ice due to both 
the change in land prices and the variability of past land prices . 
Of inte r es t i s how variabil ity of net farm income is related to , 
changes in land prices. The coefficient for the variance in net farm 
income , VRNOl, has a positive sign , the opposite of initially expected. 
However, the te r m fo r the var•ance of net farm income squared, VNOlSQ, is 
negative . This indicates, g i ven the size of the coeff i cients, that as 
va r iance in net farm income increases, the expected c hange in land prices 
start s at zero , first increases then dec r eases and finally becomes 
negative. This could be due in pa r t to a correlat i on between net farm 
income and var i ance in net fa rm inc ome ; the co rrelation coefficient is 
approximat e ly 0 .60. 
The coefficient for the ef fect of the va riat ion of land pr ices, 
CVLP, i s also of the unexpected sign . This, too, may be due in part to 
the high correlat i on between CVLP and DTLPl, the ch ange in land pric e 
Table 4. Land pr1c1ng models (land price, LP; percentage change in land 
price, CHLPP) coefficients, t-values in parentheses, and R2 
estimated by linear least squares regression 
Dependent ---------------Independent variable---- -------- ---
















(0 . 68) 
172.155 
(5.49)*** 
aDTNI = the change in net farm income in the last year. 
- . 052 
( -2.18 )** 
l. 023 
(2 .42 )** 
bDTN2 net change in net fa rm income in the two years preceding 
last year. 
cVRNOI =variability of net farm income per acre in the three 
previous years . 
dCVNOI VRNOI divided by last yea r ' s land price. 
eDTLPl change in land price in the last year . 
fDTLP2 = net change in land price in the 2 years previous to last 
year. 
gRLINT = real interest rat e; l oan interest rat e - inflation . 
hDLR = change in loan interest rate from previous year. 
1 CVLP = variability of land prices over last 3 years divided by last 
year's price. 
jSDCVLP = square root of CVLP. 
kVNOISQ = VRNOI squared . 
*Significant at the 10 percent l evel. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent l evel. 
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DTLP2£ RLI NTg DLRh CVLP 1 socv1pJ VNOISQk R2 
- 4 . 335 2 . 399 . 383 - . 0000158 . 8396 
( - 4 . 69 )*** ( l. 62) (l.80)* ( -. 90) 
l. 5 78 46 . 314 49 . 644 - 17 . 539 - . 0042 .9734 
(4 . 08)** (2 . 08)* ( l . 63) ( - .52) ( - 4.54)*** 
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last year. The co r relation coefficient between CVLP and DTLPl is greater 
than 0.80 fo r the years 1960 through 1982. However, adding a quadratic 
te r m for CVLP did not help the model. 
Model scenar ios 
In determining what scenarios to run, two starting dates were 
chosen, 1964 and 1976. Since the model runs for 15 years, the ending 
years of the runs are 1978 and 1990. Thr ee initial farm sizes were used, 
160, 320, and 640 acres. Two initial debt structures will be used: l ) a 
normal debt load based on Iowa data from the Census of Agriculture and 2) 
a no-debt structure used on the two smallest farm sizes for 1964 starts 
and the smallest farm size f or 1976. 
The five possible initial farm scenarios for 1964 (see Table 5) are 
first used to check the r el iability of the model . This is done by using 
actual pr i ce levels and interest rates observed during that time period. 
There are three debt management options available to the farmer. 
The first is a no-debt option where expansion is be financed only by 
equity, but debt can be used to meet necessary expenses if there is a 
temporary shortage of equity funds. The second is an aggressive expan-
sion policy where the fa r mer sets a relatively high self-imposed debt-to-
asset ratio maximum and is therefore, expanding the farm at the earl iest 
opportunity. The third i s a mor e middle of the r oad approach where the 
farmer sets aside the value of a portion of the farm, 160 acres, whic h 
will not be used as collateral against debt but any assets over the base 
portion can be borrowed agains t at the aggressive expansion l evel . 
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Table 5. 1964 in i tial farm scenar1. 0S 
Acres 160 320 640 160 320 
As sets 
Current 11,616 20,841 39,291 11,616 20,84 1 
Inte rmediate 8 ,517 12,692 21,042 8,5 17 12, 692 
Long term 46,560 93 , 120 186,240 46,560 93,120 
Financ ial 3,335 6 , 333 12, 329 3 ,335 6,333 
Total 70,028 132 , 986 258,902 70,028 132 , 986 
Liabilities 
Short term 4,488 9 , 672 20 ,265 0 0 
Int e rmediate t e rm 3,292 5,889 10,854 0 0 
Long term 7,572 15,143 30,286 0 0 
Total 15,352 30,704 61,405 0 0 
Net wor th 54,676 102 ,282 197,497 70,028 132,986 
For both the 1964 and 197~ runs l ong t erm debt has (1) a 20 twen t y 
year r epa yment schedule, (2) no bal loon r epayment , and (3) variable 
in terest r ates. Int e rmediate t e rm debt is f or two yea r s with 50 percent 
of the principal due each year. Short te r m debt has a one yea r term. 
The c r edi t limit ts equal to 20 percent of the cur r en t assets pl us 
75 percent of the sum of in termediate and long term assets . 
Int ermediate asset r ates are allowed t o drop to 85 pe rcent of the 
desired level, based on the optima l asset ratio, befo re investment in 
inte rmediate assets i s required to r estore asset ratios . 
Consumption by the farme r is determined by t he level of net 
operat ing income. If net ope rat ing income i s l ess than or equal to zero, 
then consumption is set at $10,000 . If net operating income is posi tive 
but less t han $100,000, consumption is set at $15,000 . And for levels of 
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net ope rating income greater than $100,000, consumption is $20,000. No 
provisions are made in the mode l for o ff-farm income , but off-farm income 
could easily be added in. 
The 1976 s t a rt s are of interest 1n that forecasts can be under 
different scenarios of future trends in prices and interest r ates . 
The ne t farm income per acre for the s tate can be broken down into 
two periods 1964-1971 and 1972-1983. For the earlier period, the mean 
level ne t farm income and the coeff i cient of variation ar e both lower 
than fo r the lat e r period (see Tabl e 6). 
Reinders discusses the triangular distributions t o generate Monte 
Carlo variat es ( Reinders, 1983, p. 163) . The paramet e rs of the 
triangular di s tributions are pr esent ed 1n Tabl e 7. 
Both periods evidenc e plalykurtic behavior relative t o a normal 
dist ribution; therefore, more than 95 pe r cent of the distributions are 
inc l ~ded in the tri angular dis tributions . 
To fo r ec ast fo r the period 1984 th r ough 1990, estimates were needed 
for the c urrent and intermedia te asse t price indexes , th e GNP deflater, 
l ong t e rm and sho rt t erm inte r est rat es, the level and variab ility of net 
farm inc ome, and Land prices . The predicted land prices are in part 
based on the assumptions about the o ther variables . 
Fo r the price and int e r es t rat e ind exes fo r the period 1985-1990, 
two sets of values are examined, see Tabl e 8 . Set A is ba sed on t he 
pe riod 1982-1984 using an inflation rat e for the GNP deflato r of 4.47 
percent and a r ea l int e r est r ate of 8 .417 pe r cent. The curren t and 














Statistical measures of net fa rm income per acre for Iowa 
Coefficient 
Mean Standard Skewness Kurtosis of variation 
x deviation (y 1) * (y 2) ** (CV) 
41. 100 22.66 - 0 . 331 - 0.035 . 5513 
28.43 4.25 - 0 . 347 -1.196 .1 495 
Parameters of triangular distribution with probability of 
ninety-five percent (P-.95) 
Lower 1 imi t Upper limit Mode Mean 
A B M x 
- 0.078 2.078 0.8175 l. 000 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with respect to the GNP index, 1.8 percent per year for the current asset 
price index and 3.3 percent per year fo r the intermediate asset index. 
Set B is based on the period 1974-1981 with an ave rage rate of increase 
in the GNP deflator of 7.362 percent and an assumed r eal interest rate of 
2. 108 percent. Also, the current and intermediate asse t price indexes 
were assumed to grow at faster r ates relative to the GNP deflator; 3.78 
percent per year for the current asset index and 4. 78 percent per year 
for the intermediate asset index . 
The land price model is not well-suited to make long term forecasts 
for land prices due to the relatively large impact of short term c hange s 
of the variables on land prices, for exampl e , a $30 per acre inc rease in 
net fa rm income. With everything else the same, almost a 10 percent 
tncrease in land price the next ye ar could occur. However, estimating 
yearly l evels of farm income is much mo r e difficult and is subject t o 
greater error than estimating general levels of net farm income for 
longer periods of time . This does not mean that the model is useless; 
the effect of changes in the general l evel of variables on land prices 
can be examined. For example, an increase in the average level of net 
farm income of $10 per acre would, given everything else r emaining 
constant, indicate an increase in land prices of approximately 8.9 
percent given the combined affec t s of a change in net farm inc ome through 
the DTNl and DTN2 variables (see Table 4). In this way, the land pr ice 
model can be us ed to adjust expected future land prices when using 
different scenarios of other variables. Thus, if the farm model 1s run 
under a new scenario of higher inflation or lower variability o f net farm 
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income proper adjus tments can be made t o expected l and prLces to r ef lect 
these o the r changes and, therefor e, the full effec t of t hese changes on 
farmer s financial conditions can be better unde r stood . 
To sum up, fo r the 1964 starti ng da t e there a r e t hree farm sizes. 
Two of which a r e examined unde r a no debt s i tuation, and for the runs 
with debt, there are three debt management op tions . Fo r the 1976 
starting dat e , there are th r ee farm s izes, one of which lS examined under 
a no debt situation . For the runs wi th debt, the r e are th r ee debt man-
agement options; fo r the period afte r 1984, there a r e two sets of mac r o 
economic indicat ors and t wo levels o f possible net fa r m income . 
Between 1981 and 1984, farmland prices ln Iowa dropped by ove r one-
third and in 1984 land prices were actuall y sligh tly less than Ln 1976. 
Whet he r La nd prices dec line ove r the next five years depends upon many 
factors. The two main facto r s, in broad ca tego ries, are expectations 
about farm income a nd interest r ates. Although these two areas are not 
independen t, it is convenien t to examine each in turn. 
Farm income during the 1970s and early 1980s has been quite 
var iable, but the average is l arge r than during the 1960s. However, t he 
last three years have all been well below average . If the gove rnment's 
fa rm pr ogram falls und e r the guise of budget cuts and is left to Reagan ' s 
" free markets" , fa r m income may remain at pr esent l ow levels or decline 
even f ur t he r g ive n the pressu re on expo rt s due to the high value of the 
do llar. I f , however, the dol l ar dec lines in value and farm price 
supports have been reduced, fa r m income could r emain variable at high 
levels due t o movements in the world demand fo r food . lf the Congress 
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modifies farm income supports , they will mos t probably be at lower levels 
and will dampen market fluctuations. 
The interest rate is also involved with the value of the dollar. If 
interest rates remain high relative to the inflation rate, the value of 
the dollar will probably r emain high . But if interest rates fall to meet 
the decrease in inflation, the pressure on the dollar may be relaxed. 
The interaction of future interest rates and farm income are 
expressed in three basic scenarios : 
1. continued low farm income and high interest rates, 
2. higher and more variable farm income and lower interest rates, 
and 
3. lower fann income and lower interest rates. 
These scenarios have different effects on future land prices. The 
first scenario has the worst potential effect on land prices. Using the 
coefficients from the land pric e mod e l as r ough approximations of the 
partial effects on land prices, the r e lative changes in land prices under 
the three scenarios would be unde r scenario 1) -20%, 2) +1 5% , and 3) +5%. 
If the land price dec r e ases of the 1920s and 1930s are used as a guide, 
an overall land price decrease of over 50 percent would not be 
unexpected . This would mean further land price decreases of 20 percent 
from prices at the e nd of 1984. This, coupl ed with the effects of 
changes in farm income and interest rat es, would imply land prices 
bottoming out at $870 per acre fo r scenario ( 1), $1250 per acre for 
scenario (2) , and $1140 pre acre for scenario 3). The estimated land 
prices for 1985 to 1990 are presented in Table 9 . Under an assumption 
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Table 9 . Future land pric es ($/acre) 
--------------------Sce nario----------- ------------



















that it will take two years after 1984 for land prices t o bottom out wit h 
land prices rising at a two percent r eal rate simi lar to t he 1960s . 
Simulation Results 
1964 runs 
I n r ev i e wing the res ult s of 1964 through 1978 model runs, it is 
important to r emember that land values g rew at an average of 12 . 2 pe r cent 
pe r year ove r that time. 
There we r e seven test farm models run fo r the 1964- 1978 time per i od, 
t hey we r e : 
l . A 160 acre fa rm with an initial debt to asset (OTA) rat io of 
0.219 and a desi r ed maximum OTA ratio of 0 . 4. 
2. A 160 acre farm with initially no deb t and a maximum des ired OTA 
rati o o f 0 . 1 
3. A 320 ac re farm with a n initial OTA r at io of 0 .23 1 and a desi r ed 
maximum OTA ratio of 0.4. 
4. A 320 acre farm wi th an initial OTA r atio of 0 . 231 and a desired 
max i mum DTA r atio of 0 . 4 on assets in excess of those nec es sa r y 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5. A 320 acre farm with no initial debt and a desired maximum OTA 
ratio of 0.1. 
6. A 640 acre farm with an initial DTA ratio of 0.237 and a desi red 
maximum OTA ratio of 0 . 4 on assets in excess of thos e necessary 
for a 160 acre farm. 
7. A 640 acre farm with an initial OTA ratio of 0 . 237 and a desi r ed 
maximum DTA r atio of 0.5 . 
The results were quite varied from 100 percent of the farms going 
bankrupt in run number 1 to 100 percent of the fa rms having more than 
4000 acres in number 7. 
In run number 1, the farms started with an initial net wort h of 
$54,676. Out of the 35 simulations only one farm survived past the 9th 
year of t~e simula tion and it failed in the 12th year. All the rest 
failed between the 7th and 9th years. The main problem with these farms 
was that these farms ' income could not sustain the Levels of cash expen-
ditures incurred by the farms and, therefo re, the equity base of the 
farms eroded, despite increases in land values, until the point when cash 
expenses of the farm could not be financed. 
It should be noted that wh en a farm goes bankrupt in the model, it 
does not necessarily mean it has a negative net worth. The model will 
declare a farm bankrupt wh en the sale of 160 acres of land, the sale of 
accompanying current and inte rmediate assets, and the raising of debt 
levels t o the maximum allowed by lender s abov e and beyond the desired 
maximum OTA ratio, will not raise the necessa r y fu nds that will allow the 
farm to start the next production cycle. 
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In the second run, 32 percent of the fa rms failed having an average 
net worth of $43,195 when declared bankrupt. The farms that successfully 
completed the run had an average net worth of $112,147 and a DTA ratio of 
.497 with an average of 94 acres. This still represents a significant 
out flow of funds due to the difference between income levels and 
consumption. 
The results of the first two runs do not seem unrealistic in light 
of the fact that off-fa rm income is not incl uded in the model. Given the 
large portion of total fa r mers' income accounted for by off- farm income 
many of these small farms could have remained viable with infusion of 
off-farm income . 
For the runs of 320 and 640 ac re farms, there wer e no fa ilures, this 
would indicate that these size farms could support the farmer's consump-
tion from farm income and capital gains without endangering the financial 
condition of the farm. 
In run 3, the initial net worth of the farms was $102,282; at the 
end, the average net worth was $735,263 with a DTA ratio of .357 with an 
average size of 598 acres. This represents an ave r age yearly increase in 
net worth of 14.1 percent, well above the average increas e in asset 
values. The ending DTA ratio of .357 is less than the desired maximum of 
.4 in part due to the rapid increases in asset values and also to the 
lumpiness of land purchases . 
Run 4 is best described as one of no change. In none of the simula-
tions did any farms buy or sell land. The DTA ratio rose slightly from 
.231 to .248. Total debt increased by 418 percent but this was matched 
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by an increase in total assets of 385 percent. Net worth increased from 
$102,282 to $483,552 an average yea rly inc r ease of 10.9 pe r cent. An 
interesting note, even though the farms DTA ratio did not change 
dramatically, is that only 17 percent of the farms were able to reduce 
the DTA ratio to below the desi r ed maximum level. The initial DTA ratio 
of .231 was greater than the desired maximum of .1 89 . 
Run 5 has a low debt policy yet has a larger increase in net worth 
than run 4, an 11.8 percent annual increase. This is due t o the fact 
that at the start of each simulation run the initial level of debt is 
below the desi r ed maximum level . This is reflec ted by an increase 1n 
acres from 320 to 415. 
In r un 6, all variables increase. Net worth increases fr om $197 ,497 
to $2,401,816. The average size increases t o 1, 782 •acres. Tot al debt ~ 
increases by ove r 15 times to $948,999 . However, the DTA ratio only 
increases f r om .237 to .358 which reflects the increase in the desired 
maximum DTA ratio from . 19 to .36 as the average farm size increases . 
Run 7 had to be discarded for a couple of reasons. First, the fa r m 
grew to be too large. The mod e l is only capable o f handling up to 4,000 
acres of land transactions, and in run 7, all the farms reached the 4,000 
acre limit well befor e the end of the 15-yea r simulation. Second, t he 
income and expense estimates and the asset ratios in the model we r e not 
developed to include such large size farms. Moreover, the accuracy of 
the model under these c ircumstances is questionable. 
During the period 1964-1978, high returns to farming were available, 
mostly in the form of capital gains from increases in land and machinery 
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values . Smaller farms were dependent on capital gains to meet consump-
tion demands which were not met by farm income, thus impeding the use of 
these funds for expansion, and raising debt loads since those capital 
gains are only available for use by debt financing or sale of the asse t s. 
The results of the runs are summarized in Table 11. 
1976 runs 
The r uns f or the 1976-1990 period can be divided into two periods, 
1976-1984 and 1985-1990. Of interest is the effect of the downward 
t r ends in land prices after 1981 on the financ ial conditions of the test 
farms and the implications of the three hypothesized future s cenarios on 
those financial conditions. 
Six different test farms were us ed for analysis. They are: 
l~ A 320 acre farm with an initial DTA ratio of .154 and a desired 
maximum DTA ratio of 0.4 on ass ets in excess of those for a 160 
acre farm. 
2. A 320 acre farm with an initial OTA ratio of .154 and a desired 
maximum OTA ratio of 0.4. 
3. A 640 acre farm with an initial DTA ratio of .158 and a de sired 
maximum DTA ratio of 0.4 on assets in e xc es s of those for a 160 
acre farm. 
4. A 640 acre farm with an initial DTA r a tio of .158 and a desired 
maximum DTA ratio of 0.4. 
5. A 640 acre farm with an initial DTA ratio of .316 and a desired 
maximum DTA ratio of 0.4 on assets in excess of those f or a 160 
acre farm. 
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Table 11. Farm model r esults for 1964 starting da t e runs 
Run Initial Ending 
l Acres 160 
Assets 70,028 
Debt 15,352 
DTA ratio .219 
Percent failed 100 
2 Ac res 160 94 
Assets 70,028 223,016 
Debt 0 110,889 
OTA ratio . 0 .497 
Percent failed 32 
3 Acres 320 598 
Assets 132, 986 l,L43,595 
Debt 30,704 408,332 
OTA r atio .231 . 357 
Percent failed 0 
4 Acres 320 320 
Assets 132' 986 642,616 
Debt 30,704 159,064 
OTA ratio . 231 . 248 
Percent fa i. led 0 
5 Acres 320 415 
Assets 132 '986 801,547 
Debt 0 95,682 
DTA ratio .0 .118 
Percent failed 0 
6 Acres 640 1, 782 
Assets 258,908 3,350, 815 
Debt 61,405 948,999 
DTA ratio .237 . 358 
Percent failed 0 
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6 . A 640 acre farm with an initial OTA ratio of .316 and a desired 
maximum OTA ratio of 0.4. 
Each of the stx test farms was run under the three different price 
and income scenarios. 
The results for the period 1976-1984 are the same regardless of the 
price scenario and are examined first. Next, the relative effects of the 
different price scenarios are examined. 
640 acre fa r ms with moder ate initia l debt Both o f the 640 acre 
farms started with the same levels of assets and debt in 1976 . By 1981, 
the peak land pr ice year, the net worth of the farm with the more aggres-
sive financial policy, run 4, had increased by 87.9 percent as compared 
to 74.3 percent for the more conservative farm. However, the debt level 
of the more aggressive farm had increas ed by 554 percent as compar ed to 
only 261 percent for the more conservative farm. The conservative farm 
had obtained 85 perc ent of the aggressive farm's increase in net worth 
whil~ only increasing debt by 47 percent as much. 
By 1984, the last year t ha t is the same under a l l the price 
scenarios, the net worth of the aggressive farm had fallen t o 86 percent 
of the initial 1976 l evel . The net worth of the conserv ative farm also 
fell from 1981 t o 1984 but was still at a higher level than in 1976. The 
change in debt for the 81 t o 84 period again marks the major contrast 
between the two debt management policies . Total debt increased for both 
farms by approximately 10 percent; however, the t ot al deb t of the aggres -
sive farm was 86 percent gr eat e r than the conservative farm; this is due 
to the large r build-up of debt during the 1976 t o 1981 period. 
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Both fa rms in 1984 are at higher than desired DTA ratios. The 
aggressive farm has a DTA ratio of .6 18, and the conservative farm has a 
OTA ratio of .414. 
No farms have failed as of 1984 . However, for the aggressive farm 
about 10 percent of the farms will fai l in 1985 regardless of the price 
scenario used. 
The price scenarios have different effects on the different farms. 
For the agg ressive farms, the main difference between the different price 
scenarios is the l evel of farm failures. At the end of the 15 year 
simulation, 1990, there i s less than a 1 percent differenc e in the ne t 
worth of the surviving farms. In 1986, the bottom of the land price 
cycle~ the net worth of the farms varies by up to 30 percent. The 
c atching up in net worths can be attributed in part to the differences in 
failure rates. Under scenario 1, 71 percent of the farms fail between 
1986 and 1990 under scenario 2, 14 . 3 percent fa i l; and under scenario 3, 
18.8 percent fail. 
For the conse rvative farm, the differences due to the price 
scenarios are most evident in the ending net worths. In 1990, und e r 
scenario 2 , the ending net worth is 63 percent larger than under scenario 
1, and under scenario 3, is 36 per cent larger than unde r scenario l. 
The farm failure rat es are l ower for the conse rvative farm under all 
price scenarios than for the aggress iv e farms with no failure under 
scenarios 2 and 3 f o r the conservative farm and a 6. 7 percent failure 
rate under scenario 1. 
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For scenarios 2 and 3, the ending DTA ratio is lower for the conser-
vative farm than for the aggressive farm. But under scenario 1, the 
ending DTA ratio is lower for the aggressive farm. This is due to the 
h i gher failure rate for the aggressive farm where only those who had much 
higher than average equity positions remained viable. 
The results for the 640 acre farms are summarized in Table 12 . 
Table 12 . 1976 640 acre farm simulations with . 158 initi.al DTA ratios 
Total Total DTA Pe rcent 
Year Scenario assets debt ratio Acres Net worth failures 
Conservative debt policy 
1976 $1,027,876 $ 162,404 . 158 640 $ 865,472 
1981 2,095,177 586,650 . 280 870 1,508,528 
1984 , 1,556,209 644,270 .414 871 911,938 
1986 1 1 ,166,972 68 7 '34 7 .589 869 708,889 
1986 2 1,511,968 665,266 .440 868 846,702 
1989 3 1,396,255 682,759 .489 871 829,209 
1990 l 1,411,480 690,214 .489 811 721,266 7 
1990 2 1,818,450 644,085 . 354 865 1,175,365 0 
1990 3 1,677,270 692,713 .413 866 984,557 0 
Aggressive debt polic~ 
1976 $1,027,876 $ 162,404 . l 58 640 $ $865,472 
1981 2,687,538 1,061,578 .395 1,083 l,625,960 
1984 1,943,145 1,200,864 .618 l, 095 742,281 
1986 l 1,426,254 849,26 1 .627 869 531,993 
1986 2 1,845,000 l, 151,280 .624 1,037 693,720 
1986 3 1,727,167 1,105,386 .640 999 621,780 
1990 l 1 ,726,250 624,903 .362 800 1,101,347 71 
1990 2 2,220,364 1,129,610 .509 1,000 1,090,754 14 
1990 3 2,112,293 1,022,350 . 484 945 1 , 089,943 19 
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640 acre farm with high initial debt The 640 acre farms with 
.316 initial DTA ratios are the s ame as the o the r 640 acre farms except 
that the amount o f debt carried by the farms at the start of the simula-
tions was doubled. In the lower debt runs, both 320 acres and 640 acres, 
the farms had lower DTA ratios than the desired maximums. In these runs, 
the conservative debt policy farm is at a DTA rat io greater than the 
desired maximum while the aggressive farm is stil l slightly below its 
desired maximum DTA ratio. This is observable in the changes in DTA 
ratios between 1976 and 1981. The DTA ratio of the conservative farm's, 
run 5, decreases from .316 t o .275 while the DTA ratio of the aggressive 
farm, run 6, increases to .396 from .316. What is ve r y noticeable is 
that, while in thi s same time period the total debt of the conservative 
farm increases in absolute l evel by 51 percent as compared to 166 percent 
for the aggressive farm, the increases in net worth are nea r ly identical, 
84 percent for the conservative farm and 87 percent for the aggressive 
farm. 
During the period of obse r ved land price decreases, 1981-1984, the 
added risk of the aggressive debt policy becomes evident. Total debt 
continues to increase f or both farms, but the increase for the agg r essive 
farm is 225 perc ent greate r than for the conservative farm. The differ-
ences in the decreases in net worth are also very marked. The net worth 
of the conservative farm falls by 40 percent from the 1981 level but is 
sti ll greater than the 1976 net worth. The net worth of the aggressive 
farm fal l s by 60 percent from 1981 to 1984 and is 20 percent less than 
t he 1976 level. 
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In 1984, the OTA ratio of the aggressive farm is SO percent Larger 
than that of the conservative farm, .633 versus .396 . Also, 8 . 6 percent 
of the farms fail between 1981 and 1984 under the aggressive debt policy 
with none failing under the conservative debt policy in the same period. 
The effect of debt pol i cy on farm failure rates is al so evident in 
the period 1986 through 1990. Under the conservative debt policy, there 
are no failures under any of the three price scenarios. Under the 
aggressive debt policy, there are between 3 and 6 percent fa ilures 
between 1986 and 1990 and with price scenario 1, there is a 6S percent 
farm failure rate between 1986 and 1990. 
For price scenarios 2 and 3, the DTA ratios under the aggressive 
debt policy are about SO percent greater than under the conservative debt 
policy for the period 1986 through 1990. Also, the e nding net wo rths are 
similar f o r all the debt policies with the conservative fa rm' s net worth 
being slightly higher . 
The results for price scenario l, are very much different, not only 
across price scenarios but also across debt policies. For the conserva-
tive farm under scenario l the DTA ratio is the highest of the three and 
the net worth the lowest . In fact, the ending net worth under scenario l 
is less than the initial, 1976, net worth. This reveals the impact of 
further major land price decreases . 
Under the aggressive debt policy, the r esults are just the opposite . 
The scenario l DTA ratio is the lowest and its net worth is between the 
other two. This can be accounted for by the fact that the figures 
represent only the farms still viable tn that yea r which for scenario l 
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tn 1990 ts less than 30 percent of the sta rting fa rms. In 1986, before 
most of the failures in scenario L, the relationship of the OTA ratio and 
the net worths between the three price scenarios ts similar t o that 
observed under the conservative debt policy so that the apparent good 
shape of the surviving farms under scenario l with the agg r essive debt 
policy is due, in pa r t, to the fact that all the farms that had not had 
higher than average levels of income in the 1986-1990 period went out of 
business. 
The results of the 640 acre farm simulations with initial OTA ratios 
o f .316 are presented in Table 13. 
320 acre farm As with the 640 acre farm, both of the 320 acre 
farms start ed with the same levels of assets and debt. By 1981, the 
l evel of debt f o r the farm with the aggressive debt policy, run 1 , had 
increased by over 500 pe rcent, yet net wo rth had increased by only 71 
percent. For the farm with the conservativ e debt policy, run 2, by 1981 
net worth had increased by 61 percent and deb t by only 119 percent. 
By 1984, the last year that is the same under the th r ee differ~nt 
price scenarios, the OTA ratio for the aggressive farm had risen to .642, 
a four - fold tncrease f r om 1976. The OTA ratio of the conservative farm 
Ln 1984 was .300, less than half that of the agg r ess ive farm. The level 
of debt for the conservative farm was only 35 percen t that of the aggres-
s tve farm, but the conservative fa rm had a net worth 45 percent greater 
than the aggressive farm. 
Fo r the agg r essive farms, approximately 10 percent fail in 1985 
under all three price scenarios. For the aggressive farms, there are 
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Table 13 . 1976 640 acre fa rm simulations with .316 init i al OTA r atios 
Tota l Total OTA Percent 
Yea r Scena rio as se t s debt r a t io Ac r es Net worth fai.lures 
Conse rv ative debt Eolic:t 
1976 $1 ,027, 876 $324 ,808 .316 640 $ 703 , 07 9 
1981 1 ,788,403 491, 81 7 . 275 680 1,296 ,592 
1984 1,315, 650 520,997 . 396 709 794,653 
1986 1 1,003, 777 559, 104 .557 707 444,673 
1986 2 1,291 ,209 538,434 .417 710 752 , 775 
1986 3 1,1 53 ,226 545 ,4 76 .473 709 607,750 
1990 l 1, 179 , 465 553,169 .469 675 626,296 0 
1990 2 1, 568,520 517,612 .330 710 1,050,908 0 
1990 3 1, 450 , 540 570,062 . 393 706 880 , 478 0 
Aggr ess i ve debt Eol i cy 
1976 $1 , 027, 876 $324 ,808 . 316 640 $ 703,067 
1981 2 , 179,650 863 ,141 .396 877 1, 316,509 
1984 1 ,512,1 27 957 ,1 76 . 633 886 . 544 , 591 
1986 1 1,084 , 691 709,388 . 654 704 375,303 
1986 2 1,4 70,526 897,020 . 610 831 573,505 
1986 3 1,398,788 858,856 .614 763 539,932 
1990 1 1, 409,209 515,770 .366 608 893,438 65 
1990 2 1, 803,510 872,899 .489 786 930, 611 9 
1990 3 1,650,968 772,653 .468 717 878,315 10 
both d i. fferences in fa i lu r e rates and ending net worths bet ween the dif-
fe r en t pr ice scena rios . Under price scenario 1 , anothe r 15 percen t of 
the fa rms fai l be tween 1986 and 1990, wh e r eas there ar e no additiona l 
fai l ur es after 1985 unde r either price scenario 2 o r J. In 1990, the net 
wo r ths of scena r io 2 and J are, r es pectively, 12 percent and 8 percent 
gr eater than fo r scenario l. These differences are about one- third the 
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diffe r e nces in 1986 . Thi s catching up by scenar io 
the failure of farms with lower net worth s . 
i s due in part to 
For the cons e rvative farms, the r e are no failu r es under any o f the 
price scenarios. The r ela tive e nding net worths under the three 
scenarios are s imi l ar to that of the aggress ive farms with scenarios 2 
and 3 having abo ut 24 pe r cent grea t e r net worths than under pr ice 
scenario l. 
It is interesting to compa r e the farm type s . Under scenar io 1, the 
ending OTA rat io . was nearly .37 for both types of farms, but for the 
conservative farms unde r scenarios 2 and 3 the DTA ratios are between 35 
percent and 50 pe rcent less than the r espective DTA ratios fo r the 
aggressive farms. Yet, the end ing net worths unde r the 3 scena rios va r y 
l ess than 10 pe r cent ac r oss farm types. 
Thi s implies that the e nding net worths under the 3 scenar i os are 
not greatly affec t ed by the debt management policy of the farm but that 
the OTA ratios are g r eatl y affected by debt management policy. Both 
survival r a tes , espec i ally und e r scenario 1 and end ing DTA ratios under 
scenarios 2 and 3, ar e affected by debt management. 
The results o f the 320 a c r e fa rm s imulations a r e summarized in Table 
14. 
As land values dec r ease, the DTA r atio of the fa rms increas es . If 
the farms are a t o r nea r the desired maximum DTA ratio expa nsion , inves t -
ment stops as l and prices dec r ease. All excess fund s devoted to r educ ing 
the DTA r atio to below the des ired max i mum. As l and prices con tinue t o 
decrease, the OTA r a tio continues to increase and with no capital gains 
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Table 14. 1976 320 acre farm simulations 
Total Total DTA Percent 
Year Scenario assets debt ratio Acres Net worth failures 
Conservative debt policy 
1976 $ 527' 108 $ 81, 104 .154 320 $446,000 
1981 896,026 177,413 .198 337 718,613 
1984 696 ,869 209,061 .300 350 487,808 
1986 1 541, 776 233 , 753 .413 350 318,023 
1986 2 698,202 208,762 . 299 356 489,439 
1986 3 633,838 221,843 .350 352 411,995 
1990 l 693,192 252,321 .364 353 440,870 0 
1990 2 864,040 321,423 .230 372 542,617 0 
1990 3 780,003 233,221 .299 357 546,782 0 
Aggressive debt pol ic y 
1976 $ 527,108 $ 81,104 .154 320 $446,000 
1981 1,253,833 490,248 .391 492 763,584 
1984 931,967 598,323 .642 509 333,644 
, 
1986 l 666,471 397,883 .597 380 268,588 
1986 2 858,414 488,266 .569 432 370,148 
1986 3 802,898 467,929 .583 416 334 , 969 
1990 1 779 '078 299,485 .373 331 448,593 25 
1990 2 1,019,305 469 ,900 .461 416 549,405 10 
1990 3 995,135 429,810 .450 399 525,324 10 
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from land, only earning returns can be used to lower debt. Without 
capital gains to be borrowed against, all previous commitments of funds 
such as taxes , consumption, and interest payments must come from earnings 
also. If earnings are not large enough to meet these previous commi t-
ments of funds they are debt financed, increasing the DTA ratio even 
further. A note: regardless of the debt management policy ini tia ll y 
used by a farm, once the farm i s under financial stress, i.e., the DTA 
ratio is greater than the desired maximum, all the farms use the same 
strategy to reduce the DTA. 
There are two factors that determine wh e ther a farm fails in this 
simulation model: the extent of the land price decreases and the level 
of earnings. Scenario l is dominated by the land price decrease with 
land prices falling 60 percent. The result in farm failures, for the 
farms under the aggressive debt policy, is obvious with the failure rates 
between five and ten times those for either of the other scenarios. 
Scenario 2 has lower failur e rat es than scenario 3, between 30 and SO 
percent lower, under the aggressive debt policy due to both its higher 
level of earnings and higher land prices, which are due in part to the 
higher leve ls o f income. 
Under the conservative debt policy, farm failures are much less 
prevalent due to the relatively larger reserve of equity available to 
help ride out the land price decreases. Even though the conservative 
debt policy farms have lower total net worths Ln 1981, the peak land 
price year, the net worth per ac r e is larger f or the conservative debt 
policy farms, (see Table 15). In 1981, the net worth per acre of the 
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Table 15. Net worth per acre for selected years 
640 acre 640 acre 
Year Scenario moderate debt high debt 320 acre 
Conser vate debt 201 i cx 
1981 $1,734 $1, 907 $2,132 
1990 l 889 928 1, 249 
1990 2 1,359 1,480 1,459 
1990 3 1, 137 1, 24 7 1,532 
Aggressive debt Eolicz: 
1981 $ 1 ,501 $1, 484 $1,552 
1990 l 1, 377 1,469 1,355 
1990 2 1,091 1,184 1,321 
1990 3 1 ,153 1,225 1,316 
conservative debt policy farms is between 15 percent and 35 percent 
larger than their counterpart farms with an aggressive debt policy. 
At the e nd of the simulation, the relative net worth per acre across 
the different price scenarios reveals something about the effect of the 
different price scenarios on the financial structure of the farms. 
For the conservative debt policy, farms in 1990, price scenario 1 
has the lowest net worth per acre, again due to the dominance of land 
price decreases in scenario 1. For the two 640 acre farm types, the net 
worths per acre under scenario 2 are approximately 20 percent larger than 
those under scenario 3. Fo r the 320 acre farm type, the net worth per 
acre unde r scenar io 3 is fiv e percent larger than for under scenario 2. 
This is due to the r esta rting of expansion by the 320 acre farm types 
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betwee n 1986 and 1990. Und e r scenario 2, average size of the 320 ac r e 
farm t ypes increases by five percent as opposed to less than one percent 
for scenar ios l and 3 . 
Those increases may be smal l but they are increases and thus signal 
the existance of expansion inv es tment by some of the farms. Between 1886 
and 1990, when land prices are again increasing, farm sizes continue to 
decline for all farm types and price scenar ios with the aggressive debt 
po licy and dec line o r r emain stable fo r the 640 acre fa rm types with the 
conservative debt policy. 
For the aggressive debt policy farms, the ending net worths per acre 
for scenarios 2 and 3 a r e less than those fo r their count erpa r ts with the 
conse rvative debt policy, except for the 640 acre moderate debt farm type 
under scenari o 3 . For the 640 acre farms, scena ri9 3 has h i ghe r per ac r e 
net worths than unde r scena rio 2, and vice versa for the 320 acre farm 
t ype. Also, the pe r acre net worths und e r scenar i o 1 a r e s ub stan tia l ly 
h igher than either scenario 2 o r 3 for all three fa rm types. These 
r e sult s are the opposit e of those observed under the conser vative debt 
policy . Th is can be accounted for by the higher r ates of fa r m failures 
under the aggressive debt policy. 
Wi th the continui ng downward t r end in land prices through the early 
part of 1985, price scenario 1 would seem to be the best estimate of the 
future, especially wi th the pessimistic outlook for federal farm programs 
to support farm income . The r efo re, the r esults unde r price scenario 1 
are of g r eater interest and deserve further evaluation. 
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The range of farm failu r es is large with between zero and 71 percent 
of the farms fai l ing in the various runs. Two of the runs had no 
failu r es; 1) the 320 acre farm with the conservative debt policy and 2) 
the 640 ac r e fa r m with the conservative debt policy and an initial OTA 
r atio of .312 . The 640 acre farm with the conservative debt policy and 
an initial OTA ratio . 156 had a failure r ate of about 6 percent . The 
remaining three runs under price scenario l, the three with the aggres -
s i ve debt policies, had high failure rates of between 25 and 71 percent . 
The r esults fo r the price scenario l runs were re - examined so that 
yea r ly averages of various statistics; such as total debt, net worth, and 
OTA ratios could be compared between those farms that failed before the 
end of the simulation and those that successfully completed the simula-
tion. 
The fi r s t and most obvious comparison to make is between the farm 
that failed and t hose that did not in the three aggressive debt policy 
r uns. When examining the changes that occur in the various farms, one 
no t ices the similarities between the types of farms even though th e 
init i al s i ze and levels of debt vary between the three runs. 
Changes in the levels of the various types of debt, real estate and 
nonreal estate, are quite similar. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the leve ls of 
total debt, real estat e debt, and nonre al estate debt through time f o r 
the three runs. Most noticeable is the rapid ri se tn both real estate 
and nonreal estate debt during the first few years of the run, this 
occurs even when all the farms are at their desired maximum OTA by the 
end of the first ye ar of the simulation. 
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Real estate debt begins to level off in 1981 and then starts 
downward as farmers have stopped purchasing land but continue to pay off 
real estate debt. The farms that fail increase real estate debt faster 
than the successful farms and have approximately 20 percent higher real 
estate debt by 1981. This is due in part to the larger size, in acres, 
of the farm that will fail, however, the difference in acre s is roughl y 
only one-half of the differences between levels of real estate debt. 
This indicates that the farms that will fail used, on average, a higher 
level of debt financing for the acquisition of new land . 
During the same per iod, the level of nonreal estate debt for the 
farms that will fail has been slightly below that of the successful 
farms, even though the farms that will fail are larger and will thus have 
larger operating expenses and levels of intermediate assets to finance. 
The net affect on total debt LS that the farm that will fail with 
slightly higher, about 5 percent, total debt through 198 1 . Also, the 
ratios of real estate to nonreal estate debt has remained fairly constant 
through this time period at near l to l. 
Where real estate debt peaks in 1981 and then starts a steady 
decline, nonreal estate debt continues to increase unt il 1984 or 1985 
before starting dramatic decreases. The increases in nonreal estate debt 
more than compensate for decreases in r ea l estate debt after 1981 so that 
t o tal debt continues t o increase until nonreal estate also sta rt s to 
decrease. The gap in total debt between the successful farms and those 
that will fail increases to about 10 percent as the farms' that will fail 
nonrea l estate debt becomes larger than that of the successful farms. 
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Even though land values continue decreasing in 1985 and 1986, the 
total debt of the successful farms and those that fail decreases . The 
gap in tota l debt widens even further to about 20 percent. This decrease 
in total debt c an be explained by the sa le of farm assets by the farms. 
In 1985 the average size of farms starts to decrease as the farms se ll 
off assets t o meet fund needs . This selling o ff of assets does three 
things, (1) reduces the need for funds in the next period for production 
expenses, (2) makes the receipts from the sales available for use, and 
(3) reduces the credit limit of the farm. The third factor, reduced 
credit limit may fo rce repayment of debt if the new lower c redit limit is 
below the o ld level of debt, this in turn reduces the receipts available 
to meet the previous demands for funds. 
The successful farms sell off between 25 percent and 45 percent o f 
their land while the farms that fail only sell off between 15 percent and 
25 percen t of the land. When the se ll-offs of assets begin, the average 
OTA ratios, are between .66 and .71, with these high OTA ratios, 
repayment of debt must occur to keep the amount of total debt below the 
credit limit. 
The affect of such large scale selling of land on land prices is 
unknown. These sales, however, are not stric tly price related. In the 
conservative debt policy runs, land r ed uctions are beween O and 10 
percent even though land prices have the same patterns, so it is not so 
much the change in the price of land that causes sales, but the change in 
the financial st rucutre of a farm c aused by l and price changes t hat 
induce the sales . 
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The total assets of the farms that failed started identical to those 
that succeeded in eac h run, see Figures 5, 6 and 7, by 1981 the total 
assets of the farms that fail are bet we en five and ten percent greater 
than those that s ucceed ed . The d i ffe r ence in net worth between the fa rms 
is similar , see Figures 9, 10 and 11, with the farms that fail having net 
worth o f between five and ten percent larger by 1981 than fo r those farms 
that succ eeded. 
At this point, one wou ld be ha rd pressed to see any reason for one 
group t o fail and the other no t t o . To see the r eason f o r the farm 
failures net cash income, NCI, must be examined. Figures 13, 14 and 15 
show the lev e ls of net cash income avail abl e at the end of a year. Net 
cash income defined as net ope r ating income afte r taxes mtnus cash fixed 
ex penses minus consumption minus i nteres t owed on outstand ing debt . This 
represents the amount of cash fund s available fo r (1) pr incipa l 
repayment, (2) inves tment in assets, or (3) next year pr oduction 
expenses, and represents a noncapital gains produced increase i n the 
equity of the farm. The distinction in net cash income is qu i te apparent 
if the average l eve ls for the period; 1976-1 981 and 1982- 1987 are 
compared between fa rms that failed and ones that succeeded . Fo r the 640 
acre farms the average cash income of the fa il ed farms was 40 perc ent 
larger for 1976-1981 and 17-25 percent small e r for 1982-1987 than for the 
farms that succeeded . For the 320 acre fa rm net cash income for the 
farm s that failed ave raged 23 percent g r ea t e r than for those that 
succeeded for 19 76-1981. For 1982-1987 net cash income for farm that 
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failed was negat ive, a 11 percent decrease, while net cash i ncome for the 
farm that succeeded decreased by only 20 percent. 
In all three runs the net c ash income of the farms that failed was 
substantially higher than for those that succeeded, between 1976 and 
1981, this in part explains their more rapid g r owt h, during the period 
when land prices were increasing. During the land price decreases when 
the capital gains are negative and the cash increases in equity are 
needed to offset capital losses those that failed had below average net 
cash income. This is in general since the figure s are for the averages, 
there are certainly specific instances where farms did not follow the 
general pattern of the typically failed or successful farm due t o the 
stochastic nature of income in the model. 
This suggests that not only net cash income during the land price 
decreases affects survivability but that relative change in net cash 
income LS important. Because if net cash income during the 1976 to 1981 
period was not important, th en given the s t ochastic nature of the income 
levels there should have not been a signif icant difference between the 
NCI of successful and failed farms in that period . 
The implication of this on the t ypes of farmers, marginal versus 
efficient, that are in the most dange r of failure is important when t he 
long t e rm efficiency of farmers is considered. The model shows that 
those most in danger of failure are those who had much higher than 
average returns in the late '70's and early ' 80 ' s and lower than average 
returns in the mid t o late '80's, it is hard to see where marginally 
efficient farmers fit this pattern. So the claim that those farmers wh o 
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are failing do not deserve to be farmers, are not efficient enough, will 
be hard to substanciate. 
A second comparison that should be made under price scenario l is 
across debt policies for farms of a given size and initial debt. The 640 
acre farm with an initial DTA ratio of .312 is interesting because of the 
large difference in failure rates, under the aggresive debt policy 71 
percent of the farms fail and under the conservative debt policy none of 
the farms failed. 
The most noticeable difference is how total debt and nonreal estate 
debt change through time, see Figures 3 and 4. As stated earlier, under 
the aggressive debt policy both total debt and nonreal estate increase 
dramatically until about 1984 then begin to decrease. For the conserva-
tive debt policy both total debt and nonreal estate debt increase , 
continually, except in 1977 and 1987, until the end of the simulations . 
At the start of the two runs, real estate and nonreal esta te debt each 
account for about 50 percent of the total debt. For the aggressive debt 
policy farms at the end o f the simulation, the ratio of nonreal es tate to 
real estate debt is still nearly l to l after having reached a peak of 2 
to l in the middle of the simulation. For the conservative debt policy 
farms, the ratio of nonreal estate t o real es tat e debt also starts at l 
to l and then inc reases to 2 to l in the middl e of the s imulation, but 
then continues to increase to 3 to l by the end of the simula tion . Even 
though nonreal estate debt rises in the conservative debt policy run it 
never reaches the level of the peak nonreal estate debt under the 
aggress ive debt policy. Real estate debt follows near l y the same pattern 
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under both debt policies, i.e., a g r adual dec line until 1978 then rapid 
increases until 198 1, then gradu al decreases the r es t of the simulation, 
the only major difference is the jump in real esta te debt unde r the 
aggressive debt policy in the first year. 
Given the similarity of debt patt e rns i n the early pa r t of the 
s imulations and the s imilar t otal asset patterns, see Figures 7 and 8, it 
is not surprising that the peak net worths, see Figures 11 and 12, in 
1981 , differs by les s than S percent at a level about twice the initial 
net worth. The ending net worths of the farms vary greatly . The end ing 
net worths of the s ucce s sful farms with the aggressive deb t policy are 
nearly 40 pe rcent gr ea t e r than t hose of the conse rvative debt policy. It 
a lso should be noted that in 198 6 when both land values and net worths 
are at the minimum, the average net worths under the aggressive debt 
policy of the successful farms is 15 percent less and 30 percent less for 
the farms t ha t fail than under the conserv a t ive debt r un . This i ndica t es 
that the relative r ecove r y in net worth by the su rviving farms under the 
aggres s i ve debt policy is on average grea t e r than for those under the 
mo re conservat ive debt policy. To c heck t o see the affect of the 
stochas tic income on the sur viving fa rm unde r the agg r essive debt policy , 
the same fa rms that su r vived we r e found under the conse rvative deb t 
policy run, this was possible since t he same set of stochas tic stock 
variabl es was used in e ach run, and the ir average OTA ratios and total 
asset s were found to be l ess than 3 pe rcent diffe r ent f r om the ave rages 
o f the who le run. Thi s would indic ate t hat t he su r viving far ms with the 
aggressive debt policy did not have much higher t han ave r age income 
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levels but that their patterning o f high and low income years wi t hin the 
simulation were better suited f or farm survival. 
One e xplanation for t he differences in total debt and nonreal es tate 
debt patterns is the difference in the amounts of assets sold . Under the 
aggressive debt policy, farms be twee n 20 and 30 percent of l and is sold 
with accompanying assets and fo r the cons ervative debt policy, about 5 
percent is so ld . Given that the r e payment o r de r in t he model wh en deb t 
repayment i s necessary t o reduce the total debt be l ow the c redit limit is 
l) short term debt, 2) int e rmediate debt, and 3) r e al estate debt, the 
decrease in nonre al estat e debt in the aggress ive debt run is obviously 
due t o forced deb t repayment. 
Since these two runs sta r t out with identica l deb t and assets, a 
comparison of the net cash incomes, NCI, woul d show the affect of t he 
diffe r ent debt pol icies on net cash income , see Figures 15 and 16. 
During the period 1976-1981, the ave rage NCFI fo r conse rvativ e debt run 
was $28,494 per year , nearly id entica l t o $28,6 18 per year for t he farms 
that will fa il in the aggressive debt policy run but 40 percen t la rge r 
than the $20,139 pe r year average for the successful farms under the 
aggressive debt policy. 
During the 1982 through 1987 per i od , the ave rage NCFI for conserva-
t iv e debt policy fa rms i s $36,703 pe r year which i s 2 . 8 t i mes as large as 
the $13,084 pe r yea r for the f a rm that fai l a nd 1.8 time s as large as the 
$20, 179 per year f o r the fa rm s t hat s ucceeded unde r the aggressive deb t 
policy. The average for 1976-198 7 are $32,225, $21,561, and $20,457 per 
year for the conserva tive debt po l icy , fa il ed farms and s uccessful farms 
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under the aggressive debt policy respectively. There is only a S perc ent 
difference ove r the eleven years between the failed and successful farms 
under the aggressive debt policy, which are over 30 percent less than for 
the conservative debt policy farms. 
The 15 year average for the successful farms under the aggressive 
debt policy is $23 ,448, 30 percent less than the $33,792 15 year average 
for conse rvative debt policy farms. 
The choice of debt policy affects the general level of net cash 
income as evidenced by the large differences in NCFI between the two 
runs. This is turn affects the general risk of farm failure, zero 
percent failures versus 71 percent failures for the long runs. However, 
the patterning of NCI levels with respect to changes in land prices is of 
major importance in determining which farms fail at a given level of 
income. Note the similarity of the 11 year averages in the aggressive 
debt policy run and the dissimilarities between the two period averages. 
Summary of Result s 
1964 runs 
The simulation mod e l showed that the 160 acre farm s were unabl e t o 
gene rat e suffic ient returns to meet the consumption and other cas h 
demands of the farms . The cash out-flow forced the use o f debt financing 
fo r production expenses, which in turn increased cash out-flows by 
increasing interest and principal payment obligations. Ev en though net 
worths of the farms were increasing, due to capital gains, the farms wer e 
unable to mee t c ash outflows . 
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The 320 a c re farms were able to generate sufficient fund s to meet 
cash demands without having to increase DTA ratios. Increases in OTA 
ratios were observed to have large positive effects on the size and net 
worths of the fa rms . 
The 640 acre farms gene rated more than sufficient funds to meet cash 
demands and were able to use the excess funds along with increases in OTA 
ratios for expansion allowing for very rapid rates of expansion. 
1976 runs 
The results of the 1976 runs revealed the influence of both debt 
management policies and price scenarios on farm failure ri sk and expan-
sion potential. The cho i ce of debt management policy by farmers had a 
sign ific ant effect on farm failure rates and this in turn affected the 
relative financial conditions of the surviving farms under the different 
price scenarios. 
The effects of the price scenarios on the financial structure of the 
farms is best seen under the conserva tive debt policy, where the effects 
of different levels of farm failure does not distort the r elative ending 
financial conditions. 
Unde r price scenario 1, low farm income and high r e a l interest 
rates, the risk of farm failures under the aggressive debt policy is four 
to five times as large for the 640 acre farms and two and one- half times 
as large for the 320 acre farms as for the othe r price scenarios. 
Under price scenario l with the conse rvative debt policy farms 
facing risks of farm fa ilure similar to those of the other price 
scenarios, yet they have noticeably highe r OTA ratios and lower net 
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worths. Within a run, the main difference between the successful and the 
failed farms is the distribution of ne t cash income through the run . The 
average level of net cash income for the enti r e simulation varied little 
between successful and fai led farms. However, there were significant 
differences between the net cash income levels of the successful and 
failed farms in both the periods of increasing and decreasing land 
prices, with the failed farms having higher average levels of net cash 
income during the period of increasing land pric e s and lower average 
levels during the period of dec reasing land prices, as compared to the 
s uccessful farms. 
The differences between runs tn average levels of net cash income 
showed up in the probability of failu r e in the various runs, with th e 
conservative debt policy runs having higher levels of net cash income, 
due to lower interest payments, and lower failure rates than their 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
The choice of debt management strategy by farmers plays an important 
role in determining the returns to owning land, as measured through the 
change in net worth of the operation. 
Significant portions of the returns during the period 1964-1981 were 
due to capital gains especially on land. These capital gains could only 
be used to expand the operation by debt financing using the increased 
value of previously held land as collateral. 
During the 1964-1978 period, the returns to borrowing were high even 
at high levels of debt. For example, in 320 acres, farms with approxi-
mately a .24 OTA ratio had an increase in net worth of 375 percent from 
1964-1978 .. While farms that inc reased their OTA ratio from . 24 t o . 36, , 
experienced an increas e in net worth of 620 percent for the same per i od. 
This implies that the increase in debt level provided an increase in net 
worth of 245 percent of the 1964 level for the period 1964 through 1976 . 
During the period 1976 through 198 1 , this high return to debt seems 
to have tapered off, especially at higher l evels of debt. For e xampl e , 
in the 640 acre farm with an initial OTA ratio o f .316 when the DTA ratio 
was increased by .08 the increase in net worth was only 2 to 3 percent 
larger than if the OTA ra tio was decreased by .04. This decrease return 
to having debt can be attributed to the higher interest rates experienced 
in this later time period. 
The higher returns to debt in the earlier time per iod may have more 
than offset th e increased ri sks from land price volatility. However, 
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during the l970s and early 1980s debt financing of land purchases became 
increasingly less pr ofitable even though land prices were continuing to 
rise. Wh en the land pr ices started their decline, farmers who had not 
lowe r ed debt levels to match the dec r eased returns to debt had in effect 
lowered thei r retur ns without lowering risk fr om land price movement. 
This can be shown in the hypothetical price scenar ios. Under 
scenarios 2 and 3, interest rat es are at lower levels than under scenario 
l implying relatively higher, although st ill possibly negative, returns 
to holding debt. The effect of t hi s on end ing net worths and fa rm 
fa ilure rates is qui t e evident even on farms wi th relatively low levels 
of debt in 1981, the 320 acre farm with the conse r vative debt policy is 
the best example . 
The farms that fail ed simp ly r eached the limit of t heir c r edit . By 
increasing the ir debt t o such high leve l s, most fa rms that failed had DTA 
ratios of over . 70, the sale of assets, especially land when prices were 
dec r easing, did not bring in many new funds. This was due to the fact 
that at the se high level s of DTA ratios the sale of assets reduced the 
c r edi t limit below the level of debt and forced the repayment of debt out 
of the sale revenues thus lowering the amount available to meet the 
needed funds that caused the sale in the first place. 
The use of debt by farmers is not wi thout r isk , as evidenced by the 
effec t of debt management policy on farm failure rates in the simula-
tions. Some analysis of the r eturns to using debt is necessary so that 
the r elative risk of using different l evels of debt can be weighed 
against their returns. A discussion of the risk preferences of farmers 
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is of f e r ed here. Antle ( 1983) showed the importanc e o f risk in dynamic 
production relationships regardle ss of the risk preference of t he 
oeprators. 
One measure of the r e turns to using debt is to compare the increase 
in net worth to the increase in deb t over a period to time. In the 1964 
runs the 320 acre farms show a variet y of r esponses t o changes in debt 
levels and DTA r a tio. Run 5, the low deb t farm, had t he larges t inc r ease 
in net worths rel ative to its inc r eas e i n debt l evel , near ly a 6 to l 
ratio . Run 3, the agg r essive deb t policy, has an increase i n DTA ratio 
simi lar to that in run 5, ye t has only 1.67 to l rati o of inc r ease in net 
worth to inc rease in debt with a t ota l inc re ase in debt of nearly 4 times 
that of run 5. 
Run 4, the conservat ive deb t policy, mainta ins nearly t he same DTA 
rati o even t hough its l eve l of debt increases by 420 pe r cent . Run 4 ' s 
r atio of increas e in net worth t o increase in total deb t is 3 to 1 , 
between that o f runs 3 and 5 . 
There appea r to be decreasing returns to using debt, as measu r ed by 
change i n net worth ratio, over both OTA ratio and debt levels. In 
comparing run s 3 and 4, t he marg inal increase in net worth to increase in 
debt for an increase in DTA ratio i s l t o l on l y one - t hird that of run 4. 
In compar ing run 3 a nd the effect of the same change in OTA ratios on 
fa rms with diffe r ent internal DTA ratios i s obse rv able . Run 5 has 90 
pe r cent of the inc r ease in net worth with only 25 percen t o f the inc r ease 
in debt of run 3, that r elativ e l y nearly t he same r eturn fo r increases in 
OTA r atios are ava il able at both high and l ow initial OTA ratios, but it 
112 
should also be noted that the risk incurred , measured by future fixed 
debt repayments, to receive those returns are much higher for the farms 
with the higher initial DTA ratios. 
For the pe riod 1976-1981, the different farm types and debt manage-
ment policies have a wide range in change in net worth per change in 
debt , from. 78 t o 3.55. In all three farm types, the increase in net 
worth per increase in debt is much greater for the conservative debt 
policy runs than for their counterpart runs under the aggressive debt 
policy between 1.8 and 3.6 times as l arge , even though the aggressive 
debt policy runs have much larger increases in debt levels . 
Since the on l y difference between the conse rvative and aggressive 
debt policy run s, within a farm type, L S desired maximum DTA rati o of the 
farms , the increases in net worth and debt o f the conservative debt 
policy farms can be subtracted from the increases in net worth and debt 
respectively , of the aggressive debt policy runs to determine the 
increases in net worth due t o the marginal increase of debt by the 
aggressive debt policy runs over t hat of the conserva tiv e debt policy 
runs . Table 16 presents information regarding changes in net worth and 
debt of the 1976 runs. 
The marginal returns to increased, meas ured by changes in net worth, 
of the aggressive debt policy over the conservative debt policy are very 
smal l, between 2 and 15 percent of the returns fo r the conservative runs . 
This would seem to be a very small return g iven the fact the marginal 
increases in debt not on ly have the same repayment demands as the debt 
113 
Table 16. Changes in net worth a nd debt, 1976 runs for 1976 through 
1981 
Debt policy 
Cons e rvat ive 
Inc rease i n net wort h 
Increase in debt 
Ratio 
Agg r essive 
Inc r ease in net worth 
Inc r ease 1n deb t 
Ratio 
Marginal of aggress ive over 
Increase in net wort h 
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44 > 971 
312,835 
0. 14 
incurred by th e conservative debt policy runs but they a l so lncrease the 
DTA rati o of the en tire farm. 
The r atio of i ncrease in net wo r th to increase in debt t s important 
in that for a g iven inte r est rat e on debt it is possible to calculate t he 
needed r ate of return on the new asse t s, the i ncrease in net worth plus 
the increase tn debt , necessary to meet just the interest payments on the 





r = rat e of return neces s ary to meet intere s t payments, 
i interest rate on debt, and 
E increase in net worth per increase ln debt. 
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Table 17 presents for a range of Es the necessary r ate of returns as a 
percent of the interest r ate. 
For the period 1976 through 1981, the necessary rat es of return as a 
pe r cent of the interest rate on new assets to meet interest payments on 
new debt ranged from 22 percent to 40 percent for the conse rva tiv e runs 
and from 46 percent to 56 percent for the agg r ess ive runs. However, for 
the aggressive debt policy runs if the farmer s expected the marginal 
assets of the aggressiv e over the conservative debt policy to make the 
interest payments on the marginal debt the necessary rates of r eturn 
would have t o be between 80 percent and 95 percent of the interest r ates 
on debt . 
An alternative approach to examining the rates of r e turn on assets, 
which are based on asset values and wou ld be affected by changes in land 
values, would be to cal culate returns per acre and fr om that devise a 
maximum sustainable debt l evel per ac r e based on expected inter es t rates 
and future income levels. 
The highest level of sustainable debt per acre would be equal to the 
r eturns per acre divided by the inter est rate on debt. Thi s would give 
the maximum debt level on which the returns would meet int e r es t payments. 
With uncertainty for both future interest rat es and inc ome lev e l s there 
would be a degree o f unc e rtaint y about the maximum s ustainabl e deb t 
level. 
With uncer tainty about maximum sustainable l evels of debt the 
fa rmer's ri sk of being unable to meet interest payments is affected by 
the chosen debt level. If the farmer is unable to meet int erest 
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Table 17. Necessary rat es of r eturn to meet interest payments as a 











payments, then either assets must be so ld t o meet them or the interest 
payment s must be debt financed. One way to avoid this would be for t he 
farmer to chose a debt level; given the distribution o f maximum 
sustainable debt, such t hat there is only small probabilit y, i.e., 5 or 
10 percent, that t he actual maximum sustainable debt will be l ower t han 
the chosen debt l evel . 
Since mos t farmers not only want to make the i nterest payments on 
their debt they also desire to reduce the level of debt by making 
principal payments, maximum sustainable debt and necessary rate of return 
should probably be recalculated to include some level of principal 
payments. 
Converse t o the maximum sustainable debt lev e l i s the concept of 
necessary returns per acre. For given levels of debt, interest rates, 
and principal repayments, a level of returns per acre can be calculated 
that is nec essary to meet these cr it eria and this can be compared against 
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the distribution of expected income level s to determine the probability 
of being unable to meet desired interest and principal payments. 
For the 1976 640 acre farm with moderate initial debt, there are 
noticeable diffe rences in the returns per acre between the successful and 
failed farms in both the period of increasing l and prices, 1976-1 981 , and 
decreasing land prices, 1982-198 7 . For the aggressive debt policy r un, 
there is little difference in necessary returns per acre to meet inter est 
paymen t s, but due t o the high DTA r atios under the aggressive debt policy 
the small diffe r e nce in r e turns makes a large difference in the ability 
of the farms to meet debt payments. For the fa iled farms under the 
agg r essive debt policy during 1982 through 1987, the needed returns to 
meet int e rest payments were equal to 100 percent of actual returns so 
that even though interest paY'!lents could be met there were no funds 
available for principa l payments . For the conservative policy run, there 
are differences in the needed returns, this is probably due to the low 
l eve l of failures and the fact that those few farms that failed were 
further away from the norms than under the aggressive debt policy. Table 
18 pr esents averages for returns, needed returns, and the ratios of 
needed returns to r eturns for the 1976, 640 acre farms with moderate 
initial debt . 
The model shows decreasing r eturns to debt in both the 1964 and 1976 
simu lations, while risk due to debt increased at least proportionately if 
not faster due t o the effect of both inc reases in debt levels, which 
increases fixed financing costs , a nd increases ln OTA ratios which lowers 
117 
Table 18. 1976 640 acre farms with .158 initial DTA r atios 
Average r eturn s pe r acre 
19 76- 1981 
1982-1987 
Average needed r etur ns per acre 
1976-1981 
1982- 1987 
Ratio of ave r age r etur ns pe r acre 





































the relative s1ze of the equi ty reserve as compar ed to the amount of 
debt . 
Debt management policy played an import ant rol e in determining the 
rat e of failures in a simulation. The agg r essive debt management policy 
had higher rates of failure than the conservat i ve debt management policy 
had even when the aggressive debt policy run had a higher level of income 
than the conservative run, i . e ., compa r e the aggressive debt policy under 
price scena rio 2 to the conservative debt policy under pr ice scenario 1. 
Restating agatn, the most impor tant determinate with a run of which 
farms fai l ed was the dist r ibution of income through time for a particular 
farm, no t so much the farm ' s ove r al l level of income . 
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APPENDIX. FARM MODEL 
There are 13 pr ocedures within the farm model program. These pro-
cedu r es conduct various financial transac tions for the farm such as, 
calcu l ating returns, deprec iating and appreciating assets , buying or 
selling of assets, and check ing for so lvency . 
The MAIN program contains the intitial financial and physica l des-
c ription of the farm, financial restrictions, loan terms, and indexes for 
asset values, int e rest rates, and genera l prices. MAIN ca ll s the 
procedure TEST. 
TEST calculates the returns, expenses, and changes in asset values 
for the farm for a year of operation. TEST then dete rmines if the farm 
meets ce rtain minimum financial requirements. 
# 
If so, IA is called and if 
not, SELL is called . SELL call s END afte r the desired number of pr oduc-
tion cycles . 
IA determines if intermediat e assets must be purchased t o maintain 
proper asse t ratios given deprec iation of int e rmediate assets . If inter-
mediate assets must be purchased, BUY-IA i s called , otherwise YTCE is 
called. 
BUY-IA purc hases the required intermediate assets if fund s are 
available and then calls YTCE; if not enough funds are availabl e , SELL is 
ca lled . 
YTCE calculates the needed fu nd s t o mee t the next year ' s producti on 
expenses. If the funds are avai l able, they are se t aside and INVEST i s 
ca lled. If funds a re not available, SELL is ca lled. 
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INVEST checks for a willingness for expanston investment by the 
farm. If the farm is not willing to expand NEXTYEAR is called. If 
expansion investment is desired, available funds are divided between 
asset types. Then, if enough funds are available to purchase an 80 acre 
unit of land and the needed current and intermediate assets to maintain 
proper asset ratios, then all three types o f assets are purchased. If 
not enough funds are available to purchase land, only intermediate assets 
are purchased, and the rest of the funds are used to either reduce debt 
or are saved. If so, then NEXTYEAR is called. 
SELL determines needed funds for the next production cycle both t~ 
maintain asset ratios and to meet production expenses. If the sale of 
160 acres of land plus accompanying current and interemdiate assets will 
not meet needed production expenses for the next year, the farm is 
declared inso lvent and BANKRUPT is ca lled. SELL determines what assets 
to sell. -First, any intermediate assets over the minimum necessary for 
the size of the farm are sold. Then, land ts sold in 80 acre increments 
along with excess cu rrent and intermediate asset over the desired ratios 
by either calling LAND-ONLY and/or LAND-PLUS. Excess funds due to the 
lumpiness of land sales is used to reduce debt. If so, then NEXTYEAR is 
called. 
NEXTYEAR calcula t es end of year statistics and resets variabl es for 
the next production cycle and then r e turns to MAIN. 
BANKRUPT tabulates cu rrent year statistics and cal ls END. END 
prints out a report of yearly statistics and terminates the run. 
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Two other procedures a r e used, BORROW and REPAY. They are c alled by 
various procedures to change the level debt as needed t o r eflect 
increased borrowing or repayment of debt. 
